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ABSTRACT 
Food security is a necessary condition for the survival of every nation, household and 
individual. With the failure of the food self-sufficiency policy in Lesotho alternative food 
security objectives are suggested . Supply and demand factors need to be considered to 
develop a holistic and balanced view of food security. Maize marketing and pricing policies 
as well as food aid impact on food (in)security since they affect the movement and trade of 
maize grain and maize meal , the primary staple of Lesotho . 
A study was conducted amongst policy makers , government officials , retailers and millers in 
Lesotho to review the maize marketing system and procedures for setting maize prices at 
producer, mill-gate and consumer levels . Set prices distort price signals which influence 
decisions to allocate and distribute resources to provide goods and services for markets. 
Lesotho is a net importer of maize grain, the major staple , implying that maize pricing and 
marketing policy affect food security. Results indicate flexible informal marketing channels , 
fixed formal marketing channels and declining real producer, mill-gate and consumer prices 
in recent years . Falling real South African Maize Board export grain prices and evidence of 
subsidies to commercial Lesotho mills explain these price trends. Changes to the one channel 
formal marketing system and nationally administered price structure that would encourage an 
open market system with less restrictive interregional maize trade are recommended . 
The extent of food aid dependence in Lesotho and the possibility of reducing reliance on food 
aid are also analyzed . Primary data on food aid statistics were collected from various food 
aid agencies and institutions , supplemented with secondary data obtained from government 
documents. Results show that reducing food aid dependence is unlikely in the longer tenn, 
which has implications for the level of food (in)security in Lesotho. Food aid to Lesotho 
supplements commercial imports to meet the shortfall in local cereal production. It improves 
nutritional and consumption levels of vulnerable households , but shows no correlation with 
producer and consumer prices . Food aid reduces government budgetary expenditures on 
food, saves on foreign exchange to pay for food imports , and when used as 'food for work' 
to build infrastructure, has multiplier effects on agricultural growth, leading to expanded 
income and employment in other sectors of the economy . Poverty alleviation measures and 
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INTRODUCTION V 
Lesotho is one of the poorest nations in the world and is currently unable to provi~ enough 
, 
food through its own productive capacity. It currently employs a single-channel maize price 
support system that has been under review due to criticism that it contributes to the country's 
severe food insecurity problems and has negative budgetary implications . Maize marketing 
policies are currently subject to intense debate, publicly and within government, with a view 
to establishing alternative systems, particularly in light of new and evolving maize marketing 
policies in South Africa. Regionally, the Southern African Development Community has 
undergone changes resulting in attempts to improve regional economic cooperation and 
trading arrangements within member states and in general with the world economy. 
Food flows, particularly of staples (maize grain, sorghum and wheat), whether through 
commercial imports or as food aid to Lesotho, have been subject to considerable debate. 
Food aid has historically been important for Lesotho, especially since the early 1930's when 
food deficits in the basic grains have been experienced. The current local, regional, and 
world socio-political and economic climate make it imperative to understand the importance 
of these food flows to Lesotho. Politically, Lesotho and members of the Southern African 
Community have undergone political transformations, leading to democratically elected 
governments, whilst in the midst of relatively negative economic conditions compounded by 
frequent negative climatic conditions. The world community faced slow economic growth 
in the late 1980's and early 1990's, and when the Cold War ended most donor countries 
adopted tighter controls on aid. The Ministry of Agriculture for over two decades, since 
independence in 1966, followed a food self-sufficiency policy programme. Since 1986, 
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initiatives to modify food and agricultural policies have gained acceptance and there has 
progressively been a policy shift from food self-sufficiency towards national and household 
food security . 
The purpose of this study is to evaluate the different policies adopted with respect to maize 
marketing and pricing controls in Lesotho , and the impacts of food aid and food aid policies 
on food ' security in Lesotho. The study investigates the relative merits of these policies and 
suggests alternative policy packages that may be available . It uses data on prices , quantities , 
costs , and then estimates subsidies used to maintain price fixing and controls . Data were 
obtained from various government ministries , agencies , commercial mills , the donor 
community and other non-governmental institutions. 
Chapter 1 provides a brief background to Lesotho , its economy, the agricultural sector, and 
the factors affecting production and consumption of maize grain and maize meal. Food 
security and the role of trade and marketing in food security in general and in Lesotho in 
particular are discussed in Chapter 2, while chapter 3 deals with policy programmes and the 
implications of maize marketing and pricing controls in Lesotho . Food aid and food aid 
dependence in Lesotho are analyzed in Chapter 4, while a synthesis of the maize marketing 
system, maize pricing, and food aid ' s role in Lesotho's food security which are discussed in 
chapters 3 and 4 are presented in the last chapter. Some policy implications and conclusions 
are drawn with respect to policy options in the face of a rapidly transforming market caused 
by a changing economic, political , and social environment. 
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CHAPTER 1 
BACKGROUND AND THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR IN LESOTHO 
1.1 Background and economic setting 
The mountain Kingdom of Lesotho gained its independence from the United Kingdom in 
1966. It is one of the smallest countries in the world , comprising 30 588 square kilometres, 
and is totally land-locked . It is unique in that it is the only country in the world entirely 
surrounded by one other country , namely the Republic of South Africa . Lesotho is situated 
in the southern part of Africa between the southern latitudes 28° and 31 ° , and eastern 
longitudes 27° and 30°. 
History indicates that the British expected Lesotho to be incorporated into South Africa , hence 
had little incentive to invest in or improve the economy of Lesotho (Jones , 1977; 
Makoa , 1995 ; Sechaba, 1995) . The Basotho and the Boers had numerous territorial wars 
during the 19th Century which resulted in Lesotho losing tracts of land west of the Caledon 
river . The relatively rich farmlands to the west of the Caledon river stretching towards 
Bloemfontein in the Free State , and as far south as Matatiele in KwaZulu-Natal , were ceded 
to the Boers by Britain when Lesotho became a protectorate in 1858, as a concession to 
appease the Boer republic. The Basotho , led by their founder Moshoeshoe I , were 
understandably reluctant to give up their lands , but to prevent total conquest by the Afrikaners 
they ceded some of their land. What remained of Lesotho was the small lowland areas east 
of the Caledon river as the main areas of arable land, and the harsh inhospitable mountains 
to the east. Even today the land to the west continues to be claimed by the government as 
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lost territory (Mirror, 1995) . 
Within the modem boundaries, Lesotho is characterised by the bare rock outcrops of the 
Drakensberg ranges along the north and south east border with KwaZulu-Natal province and 
the Eastern Cape province to the south. These ranges include the highest point in Southern 
Africa and are relatively unpopulated and not suitable for production of staple grains . 
Phororo (1995) believes they are suitable for livestock grazing if range management practices 
can be improved. Across the central to western regions lie the Maluti range of mountains . 
To the west of the Maluti ' s and bordering the Free State lie the lowlands that comprise the 
bulk of suitable arable land (3 448 square kilometres) which account for only nine percent 
of the total land area (30 588 square kilometres), most of it lying between 1 524 to 1 829 
metres above sea level (Bureau of Statistics , 1992) . The lowlands comprise 5 200 square 
kilometres (17 percent) , the foothills 4 588 (15 percent) , the mountains 18 047 (59 percent) 
and the Senqu river valley 2 753 square kilometres (9 percent). 
Figure 1.1 provides a topographic map of Lesotho while Table 1.1 shows the different 
regions of Lesotho and their areas . 
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Figure 1.1 Topographic Map of Lesotho 
Source : Ministry of Agriculture (1995) 
Table 1.1 Lesotho's topographical regions and areas 
Topographic Land Category Area (Km2) % of Total Land Area 
Lowlands 5200 17 
Foothills 4588 15 
Mountains 18047 59 
Senqu River Valley 2753 9 
Total 30588 100 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture (1995) 
Lesotho has a temperate climate with harsh, cold, dry winters, particularly in the mountain 
regions, and hot summers that frequently come with violent rainstorms. The country is 
divided into four zones on the basis of its geographical and topographical features . The zones 
are: the lowlands, the foothills, the mountains , and the Orange River valley . The Orange 
River valley is home of the rich red soils and the arable tracts most suitable for irrigation and 
horticultural production. The lowlands and the foothills to the west represent the areas where 
most dry-land agricultural production occurs , whilst the mountains are mainly suitable for 
livestock grazing . The rainy season lasts from October till April, but monthly variations are 
high and rainfall infrequent, leading to drought periods. 
Lesotho has a population estimated at about 2 091 260 people in 1995 , growing at 2,6 percent 
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per year (Bureau of Statistics, 1995). The existing labour force comprises about 1,4 million 
people of whom 635 000 are estimated to be active , and some 18 000 to 22 000 new persons 
are entering the labour market each year (Bureau of Statistics, 1995). The unemployment 
rate is estimated at 23 to 25 percent (Gay et al , 1994) , and when adjusted for under-
employment, is in the order of 35 to 45 percent. 
Cobbe (1983) , citing Ward (1967) , describes Lesotho as being an economic hostage of South 
Africa. History shows that it was once a relatively prosperous country and for a while 
enjoyed comparative advantages over South Africa in marketed agricultural products (Cobbe, 
1983). The decrease in fann earnings , increased landlessness and reduction in fann 
employment brought about labour and employment changes, whereby by the turn of the last 
century , Basotho increasingly migrated to South Africa for worl<., as migration became the 
most profitable way to support households. The retrogression in agriculture from the 1930's 
accentuated the economic dislocation of rural fanning communities, disrupting social cohesion 
and cultural patterns that were important factors in maintaining agricultural productivity 
(Okai , 1995). 
The principal source of revenue for the Lesotho government comes from payment of the 
income from the Customs Union agreement with South Africa (fixed between 17,5 and 22,5 
percent of expenditures by Lesotho nationals in South Africa). Imports are largely financed 
. by migrant earnings which, with a reduction in employment opportunities in South Africa, 
are unlikely to grow (Mochebelele, 1994; Central Bank, 1994; 1995; Sechaba, 1995) . Apart 
from the massive undertaking of the Lesotho Highlands Water Development Project (which 
started in 1986 to supply water and electricity to South Africa , and to reduce local 
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dependence on South Africa for electricity) , the opportunities for investment have been 
extremely limited. 
In 1994, about 101 973 people were migrant workers working in South Africa (Bureau of 
Statistics, 1995) . Migrant remittances form the major source of income in the economy , and 
as such have accounted for about 40 percent of Lesotho's Gross National Product (GNpl) 
(Bureau of Statistics, 1993). Migrant labour is therefore an essential feature of the economy 
and has a profound impact on all macro-economic and micro-economic activities in Lesotho 
(Cobbe , 1983 ; Rwelamira , 1987; Setai, 1984; Central Bank, 1994; 1995) . The Central Bank 
(1995) has estimated that 71 percent of all mine workers ' earnings finds its way back into the 
Lesotho economy, through both direct payments and indirect contributions. GNP is 
significantly larger than the Gross Domestic Product (GDP2) largely as a result of migrant 
remittances. Customs Union revenues, on the other hand , account for over 50 percent of all 
government revenue . This situation shows the strong link of Lesotho's economy to that of 
South Africa. ' 
Lesotho had a GDP of 1,669 billion Maluti in 1991 (1 Maluti (Loti) = 1 Rand), growing at 
an annual rate of 7,2 percent over the previous decade from 1980 (Bureau of Statistics, 
1993) . The GNP for 1991 stood at M2,525 billion, with growth of 5,7 percent per annum 
over the same period. However, per capita GDP (of M927 in 1991) showed a growth of 4,6 
percent per anum, whilst the per capita GNP (of M1,433 in 1991) showed a growth of only 
1 GNP Income earned by Basotho residents for 
contributions to current production both in and out of 
Lesotho (Lipsey, 1989 ) . 
2 . GDP = Value of total output actually produced in the 
economy over a year (Lipsey, 1989) . 
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0,6 percent from 1980 to 1991 (Bureau of Statistics , 1993) . Inflation in the early 1990's was 
generally high and in 1991 averaged 19,5 percent (Bureau of Statistics, 1993). 
The linkages with the South African economy extend to Lesotho being a member of the 
Common Monetary Area and the Southern African Customs Union. Membership of the 
Common Monetary Area ensures that Lesotho ' s currency, the Loti (Maluti plural) , is pegged 
on par with the South African Rand, which is also in circulation in Lesotho. This means that 
Lesotho 's monetary policy follows closely that set by South Africa, therefore having a 
determining impact on monetary instruments such as interest rates on savings and loans, and 
also on Lesotho's rate of inflation. 
Membership of the Southern African Customs Union in partnership with South Africa, 
Botswana, Namibia and Swaziland is meant to allow goods and services to flow freely within 
the Union, but this in not always the case . Members of the Customs Union are protected by 
a common external tariff with a minimum of internal trade restrictions between each other. 
The arrangement benefits Lesotho since it provides it with easy access to goods and raw 
materials , with South Africa the cheapest source of basic consumer goods. However, it also 
prevents it from following more independent trade, monetary and fiscal policies . Some 
discretion has been allowed through bilateral negotiations for limited imports of mostly 
agricultural products, such as maize from Zimbabwe during drought years. As a direct result 
of the common external tariff under the Southern African Customs Union, Lesotho receives 
a rebate from the customs duties that is marginally higher than the proportionate amount of 
trade into the Union that goes to Lesotho. The South African government, however, having 
the largest and most powerful economy of the Customs Union members and within the 
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Southern African Development Community, does impose its own tariffs and restrictions, as 
will be discussed later with respect to maize marketing and trade. Lesotho's balance of trade, 
although having improved in the last decade , is dominated by imports which have exceeded 
exports tenfold. Exports as a percentage of imports for the period 1988/89 to 1993/94 were 
estimated at 11 ,7, 10,0, 7,0, 9,9, 13 ,3 and 12,7 percent respectively (Central Bank, 1994) . 
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Economic indicators and the contribution of various sectors to the Lesotho economy are 
presented in Table 1.2. 
Table 1.2 Sector contributions: Gross domestic production by activity from 1984 to 1993 (1989 = 100) in 
millions of rands. 
Name of Activity 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Primary Sector: 
Agriculture : 32,1 41 ,2 43,4 52,5 86,6 82 ,8 126,2 69,1 31,1 68 ,0 
a) Crops 
b) Livestock 50,3 47 ,9 57 ,1 58 ,6 103 ,7 132,0 113 ,2 88 ,7 126,8 190,6 
c) Services 6,6 8,1 7,2 8,7 11 ,2 12,0 12,5 19,6 21,7 24 ,9 
Mining and 0,6 1,6 1,9 1,9 0,8 4,4 6,2 3,7 3,2 3,2 
Quarrying 
Secondary Sector: 
Manufacturing 43,3 50,4 66 ,0 89 ,0 120,3 150,5 166,5 208 ,1 265 ,1 325 ,1 
Electricity and 2,5 3,7 5,5 4,7 9,3 13 ,8 14,8 18,1 35,5 52,5 
Water 
Building and 50,8 78 ,3 71 ,5 98 ,5 124,4 252 ,9 368,5 395,1 483 ,6 556,7 
Construction 
Tertiary Sector 
Total 180,1 221 ,6 256,7 283 ,7 359,9 429 ,8 540,8 669,0 803 ,9 922 ,7 
GDP at Factor 366,4 452,8 509,3 597 ,8 816,2 1078,1 1348, 1471 , 1769, 2142 , 
Cost 7 3 8 8 
GDP at Market 455 ,5 551 ,1 631 ,2 753 ,2 1016, 1338,4 1649, 1820, 2184, 2587 , 
Prices 8 8 7 4 ° Percentage 
Distribution: 
Agriculture 24 ,3 21 ,5 21 ,1 20,1 24 ,7 21 ,0 18,7 12,1 10,1 13 ,2 
All Primary 24 ,5 21 ,8 21 ,5 20,4 24 ,8 21 ,4 19,1 12,3 10,3 13,3 
Secondary 26,4 29 ,2 28 ,1 32,2 31 ,1 38,7 40 ,8 42 ,2 44 ,3 43 ,6 
Tertiary 49 ,1 48 ,9 50,4 47 ,5 44 ,1 39,9 40,1 45 ,5 45 ,4 43 ,1 
Source: Bureau of Statistics (1994) 
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A portfolio of the principal sources of income for households , based on a poverty mapping 
exercise (Gay et ai, 1994:20) , shows that remittances from migrant labour was reported as 
the principal source of income by 27 ,3 percent of households , followed by formal sector 
wages at 25,1 percent, informal sector wages at 23 percent, gifts 10,7 percent, livestock 4,0 
percent, wages from other employment in South Africa at 3,4 percent and crop farming at 
1,3 percent. About, 5,2 percent of all households received no cash income at all . 
1.2 Lesotho's agricultural sector 
Agriculture plays an important role in the economy of Lesotho with about 80 percent of the 
economically active population subsisting from agriculture (Phororo, 1987; Ministry of 
Agriculture , 1995) . The main crops grown are maize , sorghum, wheat, beans and peas. 
Only about 5 000 hectares are planted to other crops such as barley , oats , and fodder (Bureau 
of Statistics , 1993), with approximately 6 000 to 10 000 hectares available for irrigation and 
the production of vegetables and cash crops (Ministry of Agriculture , 1994a; Bayley , 1993a). 
Of the estimated area available for irrigation, less than 3 000 hectares have ever been utilized 
in any given period, and the projects that had been set up have mostly been abandoned and 
the land reverted to dry land farming . The projects set up to utilize irrigation potential were 
a major initiative of successive plans by the government to improve returns to agriculture 
through major investments and high capitalization. These projects were implemented using 
the ' top down approach ', without sufficient consultation with all stakeholder'S , especially the 
landowners who were expected to supply labour and land . Furthermore, the economic 
viabilities , social and cultural considerations for the projects were "sufficiently analyzed" , 
resulting in projects being undertaken that might otherwise have been rejected (Mhlanga, 
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1994; Ministry of Agriculture, 1994b; and Department of Economics and Marketing , 1995). 
For example, the BAUER project located on the Senqu River basin in the early 1980's 
invested over M30 million in equipment and infrastructure (Department of Economics and 
Marketing , 1995), but today is in disrepair and the project shut down. Other examples 
include the Thaba Bosiu Integrated Rural Development Project, Thaba Phatsoa Project, and 
the Tsikoane and Peka irrigation schemes under the Lesotho Agricultural Production and 
Institutional Support Project. 
Marketing of livestock products, primarily wool and mohair for export, and production of 
intensive livestock, eggs and dairy products have also been targeted as areas for economic 
growth. The livestock sector has outperformed the crop sector in recent years , yet 
investments in crop production have continued to exceed those for livestock. The livestock 
sector contributes nearly two thirds of the agricultural GDP (Ministry of Agriculture , 1994a; 
1995; Food Studies Group, 1995) . 
The contribution of the agricultural sector to Lesotho 's GDP has normally varied between 10 
and 20 percent, though a peak of 24 ,7 percent was reached in 1974 and a low of 7,1 percent 
in 1984. Although remittances and mine wages contribute more to the economy of Lesotho , 
agriculture in many ways is important for the economy (Setai, 1984; Ministry of 
Agriculture, 1995 ; 1991 ; Mochebelele , 1994), and contributes mainly supplementary income 
and employment to about 80 percent of the rural population (Government of Lesotho, 1992; 
Ministry of Agriculture, 1991) . However, close to 20 percent of the rural population has no 
access to the 13 percent arable land available in the country. 
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The economic contribution of households engaged in agriculture is very skewed, with five 
percent of households producing close to 30 percent of crop production (Bay ley , 1993a citing 
from Hesling , 1984; Gay et ai , 1994; Okai , 1995). The agricultural sector is no longer the 
principal source of income for most households with only 1,3 percent listing crop farming 
as the primary source whilst four percent list livestock production as the main source of 
income (Central Bank, 1995 ; Gay et ai , 1994:20). The greater government's consumption 
of GDP through recurrent expenditures and spending, the less that remains for overall 
investment and less specifically for agriculture; hence , this also contributes to lower 
agricultural growth (Cleaver, 1985) . The Lesotho government is often criticised for its 
inability to utilize all foreign investments and capital (due to its low absorptive capacity 
resulting from staff shortages , poor infrastructure , and inadequate skill capacity to implement 
and sustain programmes and projects) , and its failure in sustaining recurrent budgets (Food 
Studies Group , 1995; Department of Economics and Marketing , 1995) . 
Successive governments have pursued policies that have tried to increase productivity , 
improve rural incomes , create employment and to attain food self-sufficiency of the staple 
grains (Mhlanga, 1994; Ministry of Agriculture , 1991). Ultimately , the objective since 1987, 
has been to promote agriculture as a means of attaining increased food security 
(Phororo , 1987) . However, some distinction must be made between desired policy objectives 
and real policy objectives. This is important since desired policy objectives are often stated 
in government documents and reports such as the Five Year Development Plans and sectoral 
reports (Government of Lesotho, 1992; 1986; 1981 ; Ministry of Agriculture, 1991), but these 
policies are neither followed up or implemented (Department of Economics and 
Marketing , 1995 ; Mhlanga, 1994) . Often, the government's actions are seen to contravene 
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or contradict stated policies, probably as a result of political considerations (Department of 
Economics and Marketing, 1995). An example is the stated policy of privatization of 
government assets and machinery services (Department of Economics and Marketing, 1995), 
yet recently government has purchased and put into service new tractors. 
Over the past decade agricultural producer prices have fallen relative to consumer prices, 
producer prices in related sectors and to prices of agricultural inputs (Bureau of Statistics, 
1995; Ministry of Agriculture , 1994b), thus reducing farmers' incentive to produce (Bayley , 
1993b; Food Studies Group, 1995) . According to Bayley (1993b) , returns to producers have 
fallen significantly over the past few years . Part of this has been attributed to poor market 
and pricing policies pursued by the government. Domestic prices are often distorted by 
agricultural and non-agricultural policies. However, prices determine actual transfers that 
take place (Van Heerden, 1992). 
1.2.1 Policy instruments used in the agricultural sector 
Numerous attempts have been made by the government, usin _ ___ ~~--__ J-__ "~ ______ ~ 
boost agricultural production and increase efficiency. There has been extensive use of price 
incentives (producer prices higher than comparative producer prices in South Africa), for 
farmers in Lesotho for a number of years and these , according to Bayley (1992a; 1992b; 
1993b) , have played a major role in the development of agriculture. Government has tried 
to shelter farmers from direct competition of local goods with goods from South Africa by 
imposing restrictions on imports and on direct trade. 
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Conditions in the agricultural sector have been influenced by the impact of grain marketing 
legislation on import and export controls (Low, 1986; Bayley, 1992a; 1993b). Policy 
measures include the following: a) im ort uotas on such goods as maize, wheat, sorghum, 
eggs , milk products and livestock; b) ~nopoIY.J2owers and restrictive legislation given to 
certain boards , by imposing production quotas that discourage entry of competitors and give 
rents to those already in (Land and Agricultural Policy Centre , 1993); c) statutor owers 
given to co-operatives (eg. Lesotho Poultry Co-operative Society and Coop Lesotho) limit 
entry and reduce competition; d) pan-territorial and pan-seasonal pricing; e) subsidies; and 
f) the promotion and pursuit of the goal of self-sufficiency has protected the small commercial 
sector and to a lesser extent subsistence farmers believed by Bayley (1993b) to be at the 
expense of consumers . 
Legislation likely to have had the most impact recently on local production and marketing of 
grains is the Marketing Act of 1979, also known as the Price Control Act (Mhlanga, 1994; 
Motsamai , 1994; Department of Economics and Marketing , 1995) . The Act created a) a 
single-channel fixed price system for maize grain; b) single-channel pool schemes; c) surplus-
removal schemes; and d) supervisory schemes . The 1979 Price Control Act in Lesotho was 
based on the 1967 Marketing Act, since this Act laid the foundations upon which all 
subsequent authority is based . 
The type of p~olicies that can and have been implemented by variQus governments in 
Sub-Sa1!.a!an Africa including Lesotho to influence and impact on agricultural production are 
the following (Cleaver, 1995) : 
a) Those aimed at keeping consumer (retail) prices for staples (maize , wheat and sorghum) 
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in Lesotho artificially low or high. The two main variations of this policy are: i) low official 
prices paid to farmers by parastatals, or semi-parastatals and companies enjoying state 
protection. These institutions set their own margins , then sell to consumers at lower than 
market prices, thus undercutting farmers who bear the cost of the price differential; or ii) 
offer relatively high prices to producers , then sell cheaply to consumers by receiving support 
from government through subsidies or protection that prevents the entry of other competitors . 
These institutions import foodstuffs and/or distribute food aid and can sell to consumers at 
more or less than the commercial (market) value. 
b) Pan-territorial and pan-seasonal pricing where producer prices are fixed at the same level 
throughout the country, and throughout the marketing year. The same may apply for 
wholesale and consumer prices throughout the country . 
c) The existence of uncontrolled parallel (free) markets for food products. One of two 
scenarios may occur: the state discourages the existence of parallel markets, or the state 
ensures that these prices are regulated. Prices paid in parallel markets follow and are 
influenced by prices paid by competing agencies and institutions. 
d) Subsidies on farm inputs . These include low interest rates on credit, subsidies of 
fertilizers , seeds, services (such as mechanized services) , and government extension services . 
e) Land taxes where these may be applicable . 
f) Income tax on producers . An implicit tax accrues to producers as a result of exchange and 
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price policies that prevent farmers and consumers from engaging in a free market to sell 
. and/or buy their produce. 
g) Over-valuation of the exchange rate. The policy is combined with import quotas and 
duties which protect locally produced goods against imported ones . The exchange rate is 
adjusted in line with the currency with which it is pegged, and when the domestic price 
inflates differently from prices experienced by the principal trading partner, over-valuation 
results . 
There is however no stereotype price policy package used by all these countries and the depth 
of their policy problems differ considerably, as do policy objectives and other constraints 
(land, water, markets , social and political). 
1.2.2 Problems in the agricultural sector 
Progress in the agricultural sector faces institutional , environmental and other constraints 
which inhibit agricultural production optimisation and therefore growth . Production 
optimisation is very closely linked to efficient resource allocation and use within a sustainable 
system (Van Zyl , 1992) . These constraints include the following problems: a) Inadequate 
supply and provision of agricultural finance and credit. Lack of agricultural credit is a 
constraint to agricultural development and increased production since the majority of farmers 
cannot access credit (Low, 1986; Bayley, 1992a; 1992b) ; b) inadequate input supply due to 
inconsistent and poor delivery systems for inputs (Bayley , 1992a; 1992b) ; c) poor infra-
structural support services and marketing caused by generally poor roads and other transport 
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systems that would facilitate delivery of food transfers ; and d) poor extension and technical 
support services resulting from few adequately trained extension agents who often do not 
receive the necessary technical backup (Bayley, 1992a; 1992b; Mhlanga, 1994) . 
An additional constraint involves labour. There is high incidence of unemployment, with 
male labour opting for off-farm employment, typically as migrant mine workers. Low (1986) 
attributes the migration of household members to the comparative advantages of wage 
employment over farm employment for males and for educated females . Higher real off-farm 
wages relative to agricultural wages remain as one of the likely disincentives to further 
investments in agriculture. The opportunity cost of time spent in agricultural activities is high 
for some household members, hence they migrate . Setai (1984:4) notes that efficient 
allocation of labour in the rural or farming sector is "inter-alia, a function of cropping 
patterns and improved technology". He further contends that areas in which high yields are 
obtained proportionally have more able-bodied men available to work the land. 
Okai (1995) identifies another labour problem as the changing pattern of production-labour 
relationships in Lesotho . In the past, there was a well organized arrangement (through 
established social and cultural institutions) that encouraged informal and formal cooperation 
by pooling and utilizing of production resources , particularly of labour through the use of 
"Matsema" . "Matsema" are traditional collective arrangements where villagers and families 
join hands to plant, weed and harvest their fields. This traditional arrangement helps 
overcome resource constraints by shortening the time spent by individual effort and in 
organization. Unfortunately , this group effort has progressively broken down in most rural 
farm communities (Okai , 1995 ; Sechaba, 1995). Furthermore , other growing changes in the 
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productive relationship are those between the roles of men and women. Whilst most farm 
operations are carried out by women and there is no shortage of labour, custom dictates that 
decision making remains with men. However, a significant proportion of male households 
heads are not at home for long periods due to migration to off-farm jobs, therefore delaying 
vital production decisions. In addition, certain farm operations , such as ox ploughing and 
planting , are best performed by men and again they are often away at cruCial periods . 
Another traditional cooperative system to have declined significantly over time is that of 
share-cropping, traditionally known as "Seahlolo" , whereby farmers pool their resources and 
labour on a given field and then share in the harvest equally (Sechaba, 1995). 
Environmental constraints are also important. Lesotho experiences persistent and recurring 
droughts and other adverse climatic conditions . The country has experienced two major 
droughts in the last decade, the severest being that of 1991192, reportedly the worst in living 
memory (Bayley, 1993a) . Snow disasters , periodic damaging hailstorms, excessive winds, 
flash foods and major fluctuations in temperatures are common. Bayley (1993a), citing from 
Hesling (1984), reports that between 1977 and 1979, 59 percent of households reported at 
least one crop failure . Of these households , 83 percent responded to crop failure merely by 
buying more food than normal . Drought and the possibility of drought are important 
considerations facing producers each year. Average rainfall over a ten year period (1980/81 
to 90/91) was 785,6mm per annum (Ministry of Agriculture, 1994a) , but it is very seasonal 
and varies dramatically between regions . 
Lesotho 's natural water and land resources are limited. Though endowed with rich mountain 
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springs , the Senqu river basin and numerous rivers and streams, affordable harnessing of 
water is difficult such that over 95 percent of all farming is carried out under dry land 
conditions. Land as a resource is under stress due to growing human and livestock 
populations. The soils are overworked because there is little enrichment of the soils with 
manure or chemical fertilizers (Sechaba, 1995) . The pattern of mono-cropping also causes 
undue stress on soils. 
The performance of the agricultural sector and the factors contributing to its performance in 
the economy determine to some extent the livelihood of Basotho households, their levels of 
poverty and their ability to feed themselves . This background to Lesotho's economy and the 




FOOD (IN) SECURITY : EVIDENCE FROM LESOTHO 
This chapter deals with the nature of food (in)security , impacts of trade on food security , and 
the food security situation in Lesotho . 
2.1 Definition and nature of food (in)security 
The most widely accepted definition for food security is the World Bank (1986 : 216) 
definition of "access by all people at all times to enough food for an active, healthy life" . 
Eicher and Staatz (1985), the World Bank (1986) and the Food and Agriculture Organization 
(1986) in their definition of food security include national , regional , and household levels of 
ability to assure on a long term basis , food systems that provide all the people access to 
timely, reliable , and nutritionally adequate supplies of food. Valdes and Konadreas (1981 ) 
equate the ability of a household, region or country to meet target consumption levels on a 
yearly basis as a sound definition for food security . Eicher and Staatz (1985) found that the 
exclusion of demand issues in the definition of food security is problematic (Van Zyl and 
Kirsten, 1992) . The processes of production, access , availability , and procurement are all 
part of the "food system" and relate specifically to it being timely , reliable and nutritious. 
The Economic Commission for Africa (1993) refer to the concept of food security to entail 
food availability , whether through local production, storage and trade . They also point to the 
importance of access to food through production, operations of various market mechanisms 
and food transfers . Food security is influenced by both micro and macro economic factors 
and conditions , from technology , institutional support, monetary , and fiscal policies to trade 
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practices that affect the overall rate of growth and distribution of income (Van Zyl, 1992). 
The term "food security" was first coined at the World Food Conference held in Rome in 
1974 (Van Zyl and Kirsten, 1992) . The term highlighted the efforts of experts who were 
attempting to deal with the World Food crises of the 1970's. The conference released the 
World Food Security Compact, which placed food security at the forefront of United Nations' 
(UN) agendas (Food and Agriculture Organization, 1986). The UN saw food security as a 
moral commitment, with the need to ensure that all people could at all times produce or 
procure the basic food they required (Food and Agriculture Organization, 1986). Food 
insecurity was deemed to be unacceptable and food security a world wide concern (Food and 
Agriculture Organization, 1985; 1986) . 
Because the world was experiencing food shortages on a wide scale, the early focus was to 
increase production in those countries where shortages occurred. Thus the early definitions 
paid little attention to demand issues but rather focused on national independence from food 
imports, implying the attainment of food self-sufficiency (Mangahas, 1984). Food self-
sufficiency committed a country to a strategy that directed its economic and other energies 
towards local production, a position Valdes and Konadreas (1981) viewed as politically risky . 
Failing to meet food self-sufficiency requirements meant a dependence on concessionary 
imports of food, but also encouraged growth in protectionist policies. The strategy was 
compounded by difficulties poor countries experienced in reaching their food production 
targets, and in cases where successful, needlessly promoted exports and penetration of world 
markets at a cost. The argument and rationale against such a definition was based on the 
principle that making food security synonymous with self-sufficiency rejected pure economic 
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criteria of competitiveness and efficiency. Advocates of pure economic criterion assert that 
a country should look at its comparative advantages, and if these do not lie with food 
production shift their resources to more competitive or comparatively advantageous export 
activities . The rationale is that the resultant gains in foreign exchange earnings would 
compensate and in all likelihood exceed the foreign exchange savings of the displaced food 
crops. 
The World Bank (1986) broke down food security into the following components: a) ensuring 
production of adequate food supplies; b) maximizing stability in the flow of supplies; and c) 
securing access of available supplies to those needing them. The components identified by 
the World Bank are criticized by Evans and Diab (1991) and others because they focus 
exclusively on consumption and fail to take into account the link between food insecurity, 
poverty, vulnerability and malnutrition. 
Falcon et al (1983), reviewing food insecurity , isolated the hunger problem as one of a shift 
from starvation or lacking in the necessary nutrients, to a state of chronic malnutrition that 
affects a wide range of vulnerable groups. Lipton (1988a; 1988b) says that the problem of 
food insecurity is more than just increasing production goals and meeting targets. Increased 
production doe~ not deliver mod to the oor and destitute nor does it distribute food to 
- - - -
inaccessible_~as. T~poor, the poverty stricken, sickly and those otherwise constrained 
cannot procure or produce adequate food supplies (Lipton, 1988b) . Mangahas (1984) 
supports the postulation that food insecurity occurs as a result of poverty and not the 
inadequacy of food production. Maxwell (1991) says that food security can only be achieved 
when the poor and vulnerable, particularly women and children living in 'marginal' areas , 
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have secure access to the food they want. 
The more recent definitions therefore explain food security on the basis of the linkages 
between food availability, poverty and access to food . These linkages can be divided into 
what Sen (1981) describes as the supply and demand sides of the hunger equation. Eicher 
(1988) contends that strong empirical and policy evidence supports the fundamental premise 
that links food availability, poverty and access to food to form two sides of the hunger 
equation (Figure 2.1). 
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Source: (Rukuni and Bernsten, 1988: 175) 
Figure 2.1 illustrates the two sides of the food security equation, namely the demand and 
supply sides. Supply is influenced by factors largely dependent on local production, 
particularly m a developing subsistence economy. If production increases, so does 
availability. However, this is not itself a guarantee nor does it ensure that there is enough 
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to eat for all , nor does it necessarily eliminate hunger. Means must be available to ensure 
access throu h entitlements to food to ensure that food insecure households get food 
(Maloa, 1992). Food systems are unable to provide enough food where required at an 
affordable cost. On the demand side , food insecurity arises due to the inability of the national 
economy to provide jobs or alternative opportunities for households to purchase or acquire 
adequate food entitlements (Rukuni and Bernsten, 1988). 
Maloa (1992) provides the view, stemming from his review of Van Zyl and Coetzee (1990) , 
that assuring both adequate supply of food and access of the population to that supply requires 
certain measures to generate effective demand, usually including income generation via 
employment creation or income transfers . Addressing and assessing the adequacy of food 
supply is not simple, since there are various measures to determine adequate supply . They 
depend on the context in which adequacy of supply is used , and the measures may include 
set acceptable levels of food intake, minimum accepted nutritional and health status of 
vulnerable groups , and desirable target levels of diet. It is accepted that what foods 
consumers eat or prefer are a function of their different socio-economic circumstances, tastes , 
traditions , cultural factors and norms . They are to a large extent influenced by economic 
realities pertaining to the region, country and/or household. For example , a factor such as 
income may impact on food preferences . It means that assessing food adequacy in terms of 
determining the level of food (in)security can in a way become "a moving target" 
(Olson, 1987) . The implication is that adequate supplies should be available in times of 
excesses and shortages (Food and Agricultural Organization, 1986; Reutlinger, 1987; 
Valdes , 1988) . 
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Food security is by nature examined through measuring the levels of fo04 insecurity . For 
classification purposes causal food insecurity factors are divided into: a) production 
fluctuations both in the food and non-food sector; b) price fluctuations; and c) reliance on 
imports (Reutlinger, 1987) . These causal factors , though not fully inclusive, account for most 
explanatory variables. The causality of price is determined in the market (or by price 
distortions due to government interventions) and has many variables, whilst reliance on 
imports utilizes trade mechanisms employed by government. 
It is easier to look at the level of food that is unavailable or inaccessible at all levels , than 
to look at the amount of food that is actually available . The food self-sufficiency index which 
measures total natural production over total requirements is used as a measure of some level 
of food security. Assurance of food security is the ability of households to meet target levels . 
Target levels of households and nations are different, hence it is conceivable and likely that 
at a national level , a country can experience dramatic food shorta es , even though there is 
su luseL iQ the_world . This has been the recent case of Sub-Saharan Africa, the extreme 
case being the famine in ~ia of 1981L. The same is true where a household or an 
individual may face severe food shortages even though food may be in surplus in the country . 
To be food secure, the country and household must be able to acquire food either by means ( 
of production, purchase, exchange or even theft (World Bank, 1986; Food and Agriculture \ 
Organization, 1986) . 
At the household level of food security , whilst food must be available, it is more a matter of 
accessibility . The nature of a food insecure household varies according to a number of 
criteria such as income, earning opportunities, employment, access to land, inputs , location 
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and household size. Other factors like culture, religion, sex and education reflect more on 
consumer tastes (W orId Bank, 1988; Reutlinger, 1987). This means that household demand 
estimates differ between countries, regions, rural - urban areas and across income groups. 
Though income is an important criteria, by itself it can by no means guarantee or ensure food 
security . To households, national policies that determine the level of information they 
receive, the nature of the support services in terms of roads, markets, and gifts provided in 
kind assist directly towards attaining food security. Those at risk can be found throughout 
the different strata of the population and geographical regions of a country. Though 
distinctions can ultimately be made between urban and rural forms of food insecurity, these 
can often be attributed to household purchasing power. Typically, the food budget as a 
percentage of income is highest in low income groups and falls as household incomes 
increase . Sen (1981) has identified four forms of ..household ownership which he refers to as 
"entitlements" , and which can be converted to purchasing power. These are production 
based, own labour, trade based, inheritance and exchange. On the basis of use or conversion 
of these entitlements, a household can attempt to meet its food supplies. Inadequacy of 
entitlements could lead to household food insecurity. The capacity of a household's 
purchasing power depends not only on the size of its entitlements, but also on the prices of 
food supplies required (Sen, 1981). 
In dealing with food security, strategists and policy makers have shifted from medium-term 
strategies to short-term strategies with greater emphasis on a global perspective to deal with 
food insecurity at all its levels (Thompson, 1983) . National food security is the prime 
concern of national governments, hence a commitment to provide adequate food supplies and 
maintain or increase per capita consumption levels of food. Viewed on a national level, it 
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is clear that linkages exist between economic growth, external adjustments , national and 
household food security. ~ational food security , though a suffigent condition for h.<Lus~ld 
food security , is not a nece~sary condition (Valdes and Konadreas , 1981). The household, 
--- -----
like a country , can meet adequate levels of food supplies through p~ion, purchase-'lnd 
exchange. Food security at the national level means that the total supply of food available 
or at the disposal of a country is adequate in relation to the population needs . This can be 
estimated normally by computing an average cereal equivalent per capita (Olson, 1987). 
Growth of domestic agricultural production is therefore important for national and household 
food security, since it provides for stable sources of food, incomes and employment 
(Bright, 1991). Per capita availability of staples allows for the release of resources that can 
be used to secure other foodstuffs to improve diets and contribute to the nutritional status of 
the individual . It is furthermore important that agricultural growth be considered in terms 
of equity as well as efficiency if the question of food security is to be addressed (Bright, 
1991) . 
Food availability also has to do with the relationship between farm gate and consumer. 
Having food available at the farm gate (the production side) is no insurance that the food is 
available to urban or rural people (Blignaut, 1992; 1988). Nor for that matter does abundant 
food in one region of the world or country assure that food is available to all consumers . 
Because food is produced seasonally , whilst there is constant consumer demand, farm produce 
must then be allocated with respect to time , place and form . Olson (1987 :2) remarks that 
"the concept of what constitutes food security and therefore the way of assessing it, varies 
with the level of aggregation and the time horizon" . A time frame affects the concept of food 
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security in that it provides a perspective as to whether that incidence happens to be short term 
or long term. In the short term, food insecurity requires immediate and urgent attention. 
During emergency shortfalls chronic food insecurity occurs; for example, droughts and other 
natural disasters causing total crop losses resulting in famine . To deal with short term food 
insecurity countries appeal for aid , release national reserves , undertake massive efforts to 
distribute food and supply nutritional supplements . It reflects a state in which the basic 
adequate dietary requirements are not met (Valdes and Konadreas , 1981 ; Stevens , 1979). 
The long term conditions for food insecurity are often reflected in terms of transitory food 
insecurity, which are largely a result of structural deficits and inefficiencies. Transitory or 
temporary food insecurity are described as being a result of short term fluctuations in 
production that result from movements and changes in household incomes, food consumption 
and the general availability of food at national and global level (Economic Commission for 
Africa, 1993; Sen, 1981) . Temporary food insecurity is seen to be a manifestation of all the 
factors that lead to or contribute to a lack of access to sufficient food, and as such can be 
dealt with by co~tive measur..es such as stocking , food aid , improved distribution and 
purchasing power (Food and Agriculture Organization, 1986; Economic Commission for 
Africa, 1993). 
Al~rnatively , trade must be an instrument to substitute for seasonality. The various 
mechanisms that ensure this allocation are a function of monetary and other transfers that 
utilize the different marketing systems and institutions such as storage, transport, distribution, 
and retailing. Blignaut (1992) states that only when the processes have been accomplished 
successfully can the level of food availability be assessed. 
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This section has defined food (in)security and discussed the nature of food security. The next 
section investigates the relevance of trade and marketing in food security. 
2.2 Trade and marketing: relevance to food security 
No country is totally independent of others for all its material and physical needs . Every 
country engages in some form of trade and marketing of goods and services. The need to 
ensure food security makes it imperative then for countries to engage in trade and marketing 
as a means to reducing food insecurity. The country tries to assure "aggregate food 
security", ie . adequate national supplies of food at reasonable prices to feed its people (Valdes 
and Konadreas, 1981; Thompson, 1983). Food supplies, to enable a country to meet its food 
security requirements, should be provided at the 'right price' that ensure as little losses to 
total ,economic welfare as possible (Timmer, 1986) . Within the normative framework of 
economic theory, welfare is maximised by using border / world (parity) prices to determine 
domestic prices, which implies that there is free movement of goods and trade . The 
determination of producer and consumer prices , and the functioning of the market system 
impact on consumer welfare. The effect of price discrimination results in discrepancies 
between domestic prices and border prices. Tariffs, quotas (import and export), barriers to 
trade such as duties and levies, have significant impact also on total welfare. The situation 
in which there is free trade is illustrated in Figure 2.2, which shows price formation with free 
and restricted trade. 
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Figure 2.2 Price formation with trade 
Source: Timmer (1986: 25) 
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In the illustration, world supplies of grain are abundant and traders can source grain readily 
at the border (or world) price at price P W ' In the absence of goverrunent restrictions or 
interventions trade occurs more or less on its own volition as traders seek opportunities to buy 
and sell on the market. The border price is below the domestic market clearing price (Po) 
under autarky . Under these conditions consumers will not pay more than P W' so farmers or 
the mills cannot receive more than P W' The equilibrium quantities produced domestically and 
consumed are no longer equal , because demand increases to Qd ' while local farmers (mills) 
reduce their supply under pressure from South African (world) competition to Qs' The gap , 
Qd - Qs' must be supplied by imports from the South African (world) market at a price of P W' 
A country must have sufficient purchasing power or enough national grain stocks to achieve 
this objective. Two channels of trade are important for food security , namely internal and 
external trade , each with its own considerations and barriers . 
The efficient mobilization of resources , management and marketing of food supplies from 
both domestic and external sources , including imports and food aid (ie. increasing outputs , 
whilst reducing the per unit costs (resource or otherwise) of producing that level of output) , 
are utilized to assure food security (Maloa, 1992) . The acquisition of food supplies 
necessitates access to markets at low costs and free trade to supplement insufficient local 
supply . Access to supplies is linked directly to trade and market opportunities , whilst access ---------- ~ -- ~ 
to food by the poor or needy requires an understanding of poverty , food distribution and 
marketing , and of the natural and structural constraints that cause food insecurity (Food and 
Agriculture Organization, 1985) . Food insecurity is not just a result of natural instabilities 
and insufficiencies in food production but also a result of restrictions in world trade through 
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closed and inefficient markets (Mangahas, 1984) . The obstruction or reduction of trade in ~ 
food through substitution by self-sufficiency is criticized by Maloa (1992). The case for food 
imports or exports is best illustrated by Falcon et al (1983) who argue that food imports are 
a necessary supplement to local supply to guarantee that poor people have enough to eat and 
avoid food shortages. 
Food security, divided into the three components defined by the World Bank (1986), is based /. 
not just on national levels but also on re~ional and international levels . These links form the 
basis and justification for trade and an effective food security policy. Trade and open access 
to food transfer mechanisms through distribution and marketing are options offered through 
public and private involvement. The extent of involvement and relationship between private 
and public involvement in the trade of food grains determines the balance of costs associated 
with food transfers . Mangahas (1984) sees the role of trade in less developed countries as 
being dominated by state import and export enterprises and a few large corporations. At the 
margin, costs and benefits accrued by consumers vary depending on the efficiency of these 
agents (Temu, 1990) . 
The public sector normally constitutes official channels, which may be relatively consistent 
in the price and type of product they offer urban consumers . However, the proliferation of 
an informal or parallel market system would tend to indicate that rigidities in the official and 
monopolist system do not efficiently serve rural or urban consumers . Van Rooyen and Van 
Zyl (1990) argue that distribution systems link a country's production system to demand 
through the creation of time, form and place utility . When distribution systems are under 
stress to timely deliver adequate food supplies due to inefficiencies , they result in higher 
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prices affecting acquirement and affordability for poor households (Maloa, 1992). One key 
indicator of household food security is informal prices at the village level , since they show 
the demand and valuation for local food supplies . 
Population pressures are an important political yardstick, as countries seek to choose between 
food self-sufficiency ahead of self-reliance (security) that can be assured through trade . 
Mangahas (1984) observed that such issues are often more political than economic, and for 
smaller , less-developed countries the economic consequences are important. 
The global economic environment plays a significant role in trcgle. World commodity prices, . 
different supply and demand factors , and interrelationships that determine the pattern and V 
terms of trade , all influence food transfers amongst nations. Reduced export earnings , a I -
negative growth in balance of payments, and reduced official development assistance flows 1 
in real terms, coincide with reduced export earnings to finance imports (Kingsbury , 1989) . 
Within Southern Africa , interdependency among countries was originally sought to lessen 
dependence on South Africa . This led to the formation of SADCC (Southern African 
Development Coordination Conference) , evolving later into the eleven member Southern 
African Development Community (SAD C) . It has sought to establish a trading strategy that 
attempts to attain regional food security (Kingsbury , 1989) . To some extent self-sufficiency 
of the individual member states , through increased production or holding of regional and 
national stocks to avoid reliance on South Africa , was encouraged . Tola (1988) clearly 
advocated such a strategy for Lesotho's food security before political changes in South Africa 
occurred . Intra-regional trade is an important aspect since all SADC members face 
prohibitive costs of importing on the world market (Lipton, 1988b). Trade and market 
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liberalization that allow for f~r movement of imports and exports offer alternatives to the 
storage of grains either at national or regional levels (Johnson, 1981). Whilst grain reserves C 
r . 
can be managed to reduce variability in supplies and prices, the costs of stockholding are re.>erV'Q.. 
often prohibitive in the long term and the combination of poor economic returns and 
associated political risks lead to further price increases (Johnson, 1981) . 
Trade also impacts on the input sector and therefore on production. Kingsbury (1989) argues 
that from a food security point of view official imports may rarely reach isolated centres and 
villages. Bayley (1993b) supports this and feels that food commodities sold through official 
channels at gazetted prices do not accurately reflect the true costs of production, storage, 
processing and distribution; this leads to the creation of parallel markets. Domestic markets 
handle volumes that are difficult to estimate or predict, possibly rendering analysis of official 
trade flows incomplete (Kingsbury, 1989) . Implicit subsidies, whilst reducing transitory food 
insecurity effects , may impact on trade , and also contribute towards parallel markets . The 
analysis of parallel markets is important for examining or predicting the impact of trade on 
food security . 
The existence of parallel markets indicates symptoms of economic malaise . Private traders 
and sellers can discriminate against disadvantages consumers , most at risk from food 
insecurity (Temu, 1990). They thrive due to shortages and inefficiencies of marketing 
systems to provide a valuable service to consumers . 
Policies that affect the trade , marketing and pricing of maize grain and the implications 
thereof are examined in detail later. The description and characteristics of the food security 
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situation in Lesotho are dealt with next. 
2.3 Food security in Lesotho 
"Lesotho like most other African countries suffers from a crisis in food and agricultural 
production, it is a crisis that underlies the food security problem which is characterized by 
poverty , malnutrition, and food insecurity" (Phororo, 1987:2). 
2.3.1 Factors influencing food (in)security in Lesotho 
Contributing factors to food insecurity are typically the result of distortions in the economy 
in both rural and urban sectors. Tola (1988) also points to government inaction in stimulating 
peasant farmers to grow more food, which is basically food self-sufficiency driven. As 
mentioned before, food insecurity typically is caused by low incomes and poverty (Sen, 1981; 
Food and Agriculture Organization, 1985; Christensen and Thomas, 1993), and poverty is 
rampant in Lesotho (over a quarter of the population is affected), with surveys showing that 
lack of food is listed by Basotho households as their principal problem, and where average 
per capita earnings are Rl 403 per annum (Gay, et al , 1991; Bureau of Statistics, 1993) . 
A verage per capita earnings are very low, hence Lesotho is classified as a 'less developed 
country' and these are largely distorted with Lesotho having an estimated gini coefficient in 
excess of 50 percent (Molapo, 1995) . At any given time, over 60 percent of all basic foods, 
nearly all of it processed food , and other consumer goods, including 67 percent of all inputs, 
are imported. The largest supplier of agricultural inputs in Lesotho, Coop Lesotho (prior to 
1992) was trading inputs with a 20 percent mark-up (Motsamai, 1994). In addition the price 
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of fertilizer in Lesotho may have been 50 percent above the real South African market price 
(Cekwane , 1994) . 
Production in anyone year is limited by crop failures that account for 8 to 10 percent (20 000 
to 25 000 ha) of the total area planted . The case worsens in years of drought , such as in 
1992/93 which affected close to 85 percent of the crop (Bayley , 1993a; Drought Relief 
Implementation Group , 1993 ; 1992; Ministry of Agriculture , 1992) . Recent indications are 
that two out of every five years in Lesotho are drought-prone (Bayley, 1993a; National Early 
Warning Unit, 1994a) . Figures show that crop losses amounted to about 25 000 tons 
annually during the 1980's (Phororo, 1987; Ministry of Agriculture , 1994a) , an amount 
enough to have fed half of Maseru's existing population (Bureau of Statistics, 1994). Post-
harvest losses due to lack of storage, pests and moisture damage , contribute significantly to 
this figure . It is estimated that if post-harvest losses were substantially reduced ( about 80 
percent) , savings could provide the needs of 126 000 people and about 17 percent of the total 
grain for home use (Phororo , 1987) . 
Population growth helps create a widening gap between food needs and availability , 
ameliorated by the steady deterioration of local food production. Increased trade and 
marketing can only meet part of a net food shortfall (Rwelamira , 1987). In some areas , such 
as the south and highlands, under-nutrition occurs seasonally , particularly before harvest in 
the March to May period. It marks the period when household food stocks are low or 
depleted . In households where there are no migrant wages available to supplement incomes 
it may lead to famine or extreme cases of under-nutrition (Phororo , 1987; Rwelamira , 1987) . 
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Studies show that the average household (5 ,4 persons) needs an estimated 0,4 hectares to 
produce the cereals required for each member of the household (Phororo, 1987). Cereals are 
used as a bench-mark for assessing calorie intake since they form the bulk of most rural and 
peri-urban diets. Land holding sizes vary considerably , with the national average skewed 
towards the average smallholder farm size. Figures for 1987 show that out of a total of 
242 881 households , 92 926 (38 percent) were without land. The figures indicated a rise 
compared with 1980, when out of 239 216 households , 52 443 households (22 percent) were 
without land. This can be attributed to an increasing population. The gap in the area 
available between landowners and the landless is growing (Bureau of Statistics , 1995 ; 1994; 
Ministry of Agriculture, 1994b) . 
Basotho rely on cereals as their staple foods , which leads to unbalanced diets and exposure 
to malnutrition and food insecurity. The use of livestock products (protein) in the diet is 
limited due to social , cultural and income constraints . Skewed distribution of income, land, 
livestock, and other resources has meant that those without livestock generally suffer a higher 
incidence of dietary inadequacies. Regional differences in climate and topography also 
contribute to dietary variations (Phororo, 1987). Lesotho imports about 50 percent of its food 
grain requirements annually, since its local capacity to produce is inadequate (Tola, 1988; 
Ministry of Agriculture, 1994a; Mokotjo, 1990). There is a widening gap between domestic 
food production and requirement (Tola, 1988). Local consumption and demand is met 
through domestic production and imports. The reliance on imports can be shown by 
comparing quantities required for national cereal supply. Table 2.1 indicates the difference 
between local availability , national requirements and anticipated imports of cereals. 
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Table 2.1 Estimate of national cereal supply in Lesotho (1993/94) 
Figures in '000 tons 
Year: Estimates for 1993/94 Maize Wheat Sorghum 
A. DOMESTIC AVAILABILITY 
A.l Opening Stocks (@ April 1993) 15 .7 30.0 0.0 
A.2 Estimated Production 91.8 13.2 52 .0 
A.3 Total Domestic Availability 107.5 43.2 52.0 
B. REQUIREMENTS 
B. l Gross Cereal Requirements (Feeds + Other) 257.6 76.5 52 .0 
B.2 Carryover Stock Requirement 7.0 10.0 0.0 
B.3 Total Annual Requirements 264 .6 86.5 52.0 
C.SHORTFALL / SURPLUS (A.3 - B.3) -157 .1 -43.3 0.0 
E. FOOD IMPORTS 185 .7 51.9 0.0 
F. PROJECTED SURPLUS 28.6 8.6 0.0 
Source: National Early Warning Division (NEWU) of the Food Management Unit (1993). 
Some far reaching implications facing many households result from having to allocate almost 












which normally renders the household vulnerable to food insecurity in the long term. The 
extent to which households rationalise to meet immediate needs may be contrary to long term 
needs or demands . The lack of natural resources, pressure to crop and use of 'marginal' 
lands (with respect to alternative uses and opportunity costs) has important implications on 
the nature and sustainability of the environment and long term future of the resources 
themselves. The pressure to utilize these resources often inappropriately causes 
environmental degradation that further erodes the household and national capability to 
improve or sustain a reasonable livelihood (Setai , 1984). 
Van Zyl (1992) describes how access to the political market can help increase access to 
resources and further to push for entitlements and empowerment which need to work 
effectively. He further contends that structural and legislative constraints (that obstruct the 
farm sector from efficient operations) act as further impediments to food security. For a 
resource-scarce, low-income developing nation this can have grave consequences at both the 
national and household level. Structural adjustment measures undertaken to increase long 
term growth of both income and employment have so far had little effect (Mhlanga, 1994; 
Ministry of Agriculture , 1995). Successful adjustment measures can ensure increased local 
production which plays an important role in assuring availability of food (World Bank, 1988; 
Van Zyl, 1992). 
2.3.1.1 Production and supply 
Bayley (1992a; 1992b) suggests that responses to repeated government efforts to boost 
production by encouraging and promoting better agricultural prices have largely been 
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unsuccessful. Price policy extends to pricing of inputs and of agricultural produce. Cost-plus 
pricing has been suggested as possibly an effective method for increasing incomes and returns 
to successful farmers and their households (Ministry of Agriculture , 1988) , which impact on 
the level of farm household food security (Van Zyl and Kirsten, 1992) . However, there is 
no effective or reliable cost measure as to what extent this brings insecurity to farm 
households and other sectors of the population. Bayley (1993b) suggests that fixed prices 
effectively act as a subsidy for successful surplus producing farmers but impinge on the non-
farm sector and subsistence farmers. Price supports transfer income to food producers by 
raising prices above market clearing levels (Davies , 1987) . 
Import controls and restrictions on import licensing may have led to the creation of virtual 
monopolies. Milling companies in Lesotho are virtually the only importers of grain that 
enters formal markets (Bayley, 1993b). Individuals are allowed to import their own grains 
and other foodstuffs , but the law prohibits any quantities larger than 50 kg (for home 
consumption) at a time (Department of Economics and Marketing, 1994). Milling companies, 
which are in practice state-supported monopsonists , can purchase directly from Control 
Boards in South Africa and are likely to have favourable returns by virtue of size economies . 
Mills receive indirect price supports and subsidies from the government to stabilize the 
market (Makenete , et ai , 1996). 
Setai (1984) and Mokotjo (1990) posit that in the event of there not being surpluses created 
from higher local prices or the impact of import controls , those with surpluses will dispose 
of their produce in the internal market at higher prices . The government uses a parity pricing 
approach so that prices in South Africa are comparable to those in Lesotho. The parity price 
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system has the objective of reducing real prices and making food more accessible to 
consumers . 
There has been a widening gap between producer and consumer prices locally , and both 
prices are influenced by events in South African markets . Between 1985 and 1991 , consumer 
food prices rose by 163 percent, compared to a rise in all consumer prices of 135 percent 
(Bureau of Statistics , 1995) . This has been attributed to wage inflation, declining productivity 
in food manufacture , the removal of some subsidies , and the impact of V AT. In Lesotho , 
the inclusion of Sales Tax in 1986 (increased in 1992 to 14 percent) contributed to increases 
in food prices. Bayley (1993b) contends that interventions of the South African Maize Board 
results in above free market increases in the maize price to Lesotho consumers . Lesotho 
consumers pay about R120 per ton of maize product (1992 figure) purely as a result of the 
levy set by the South African Maize Board. Wright and Nieuwoudt (1993) calculated that 
the South African consumer pays an extra R26 (1992) per ton, above which an additional R21 
per ton is charged to the Lesotho consumer (Bayley, 1993b). This additional amount is due 
to transportation costs , insufficient domestic production (only three percent of local grains 
enter mills) and the high gazetted milling margins. 
2.3.1.2 Availability and securing of grains 
Food grains are available locally from traders , the mills and directly from farmers, whilst 
direct imports are limited by legislation. Grain imports are available throughout the year and 
supplement local production. Formal trading relationships have long existed between Lesotho 
and South Africa, with formal trading regulations established as early as 1871 (Mokitimi , 
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1990) . However, since many consumers are unable to procure or produce sufficient food, 
they receive food aid which is an important source of food grains. 
Households acquire their food grains through direct purchase, intra-household and village 
transfers, through food for work schemes, the school feeding programme, supplementary 
feeding programmes initiated by the Ministry of Health and direct food donations . Food 
grain shortages in the formal trade sector have not been reported as sufficient grain is 
imported, brought in as food aid or purchased from local producers in surplus areas to meet 
local shortages. The security of food grains for Lesotho households would appear to depend 
on what Sen (1981) referred to as "entitlement to food" . Assuming that food grains are 
generally available, price becomes one of the important criteria in determining the ability of 
the individual or household to secure adequate amounts of food to assure food security. 
Maize marketing and pricing in Lesotho is discussed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3 
MAIZE MARKETING AND PRICING IN LESOTHO 
3.1 Introduction 
The Lesotho government's overall agricultural policy objectives have been to improve rural 
incomes, provide employment and to improve national food security (Government of Lesotho, 
1986; 1992). Mechanisms to stabilize producer and consumer prices of maize and reforms 
to maize marketing are some of the policy instruments used to improve food security 
(Government of Lesotho, 1986; 1992). Strategies for food security in the 1980's were based 
on increasing local capacity to produce staple cereals, through increased agricultural 
development and food production, to maintain critical food reserves (Tola, 1988; Eckert, 
1983; Swallow and Borris, 1988). Maize is the major food staple, constituting some 50 - 60 
percent of the diet of average Basotho households (National Early Warning Unit, 1994a). 
The fear was that world sanctions against South Africa, and potential break down in political 
relations between Lesotho and South Africa, would put Lesotho under severe risk of food 
shortages, as about 50 percent of its food supplies came from South African commercial 
imports (Government of Lesotho, 1981; Tola, 1988; Swallow and Borris, 1988; UNCDF, 
1993). This prompted the government to engage in the Food Self Sufficiency Programme 
(1979/80) to expand food grain production (Government of Lesotho, 1981; 1986; Tola, 19·88; 
Swallow and Borris, 1988; Eckert, 1982; 1983), with the first objective to achieve self-
sufficiency in maize and sorghum production within five years. Maize pricing and marketing 
regulations were established to support this initiative (Government of Lesotho, 1981; 1986). 
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By the start of the 1990's, political changes in South Africa reduced fears about reliance on 
South African imports . Commercial imports of staple grains had also not appreciably 
declined , as regional trade envisaged under the Southern African Development Community 
(SADCC) had not provided Lesotho with food imports. The costs to the government of the 
large scale Food Self-Sufficiency Programme were mounting. Between 1980/81 -1982/83, 
the Republic of China provided loans totalling US$6,6 million, the Government of South 
Africa provided a line credit of R2 million and government of Lesotho secured various loans 
and overdraft facilities in excess of R19 million (Swallow and Borris, 1988). Hanneken 
(1993) estimated losses and bad debts of over R17 million for 1992 alone. These 
considerations and pressure from multi-lateral donors for the government to pursue 
macroeconomic reforms to reduce government expenditures and debt (Government of 
Lesotho, 1994; Ministry of Agriculture , 1995) drew attention to maize marketing and pricing 
regulations (Motsamai, 1994). 
Maize and grain market reforms were proposed under both initial and enhanced Structural 
Adjustment Programmes (Government of Lesotho , 1994) and by Ministry of Agriculture 
guidelines (Ministry of Agriculture, 1993) initiated in the 1980's and early 1990's. The 
Structural Adjustment Programmes suggested that government stop supporting and subsidizing 
parastatals such as Co-op Lesotho which was the principal supplier and buyer of farm inputs 
and produce and the main formal purchaser of grains . They also recommended the 
privatization or commercialization of all parastatals in the agricultural sector and of 
government owned agro-industries. Suggested reforms to the Food Self Sufficiency 
Programme included the phasing out of government support and subsidies to the Technical 
Operations Unit and the Lesotho Agricultural Bank administered credit component of the 
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programme (Government of Lesotho, 1992; Ministry of Agriculture , 1993) . 
Past research by Olson (1985) on long tenn demand for maize in Lesotho, has shown that 
despite shifting consumer trends and rising incomes , demand for maize would continue to 
grow and local supply factors would increasingly be unable to cope with this demand. 
Brokken (1986) reported that most agricultural produce in Lesotho was for home consumption 
or marketed locally in the infonnal market with little fann produce entering the fonnal 
market, while marketing infrastructure was poor. Mokitimi (1990) found the fonnal maize 
marketing system was very small and would need to expand to meet growing consumer 
demands , whilst a very active infonnal market operated parallel to the fonnal market. Bayley 
(1993b) deemed the maize marketing system in Lesotho to be inefficient and overly regulated, 
protecting the commercial millers at a significant cost to government and consumer welfare . 
This chapter extends past research by investigating policy measures applied to maize 
marketing and maize price setting in Lesotho and their impact on consumers and the 
government. It recognizes the need to re-orientate food security objectives in Lesotho away 
from those that applied in the 1980's when sanctions could have limited grain imports from 
South Africa. The need for government to implement liberalization of the maize grain trade 
as suggested by Bayley (1993b) is supported. Reduced subsidies to the commercial mills and 
the removal of price regulations are also recommended . 
3.2 Maize marketing system in Lesotho 
The marketing of maize and other agricultural products in Lesotho is primarily governed by 
47 
the 1967 Agricultural Marketing Act, the 1979 Marketing Amendments Act and various Legal 
Notices. The 1967 Marketing Act empowers the Minister of Agriculture to gazette 
regulations and/or intervene in aspects such as product pricing, trade and marketing . 
Seasonal forecasts for production are made before and after harvest and a trading account 
constructed using projections of existing and/or expected national stocks from imports and 
food aid monitored by the National Early Warning Unit and the Food Management Unit. 
Most maize grown in Lesotho is consumed by households and there are few surplus 
producers . Most domestic maize (about 70 percent) is grown in the northern and central 
districts of Lesotho (Ministry of Agriculture, 1994a) . The commercial mills are strategically 
located in the border towns of Maseru (centre) and Maputsoe (north), which are convenient 
for importing maize grain. The maize is imported from South Africa through the South 
African Maize Board which is the sole exporter of maize in South Africa. The South African 
Maize Board transports the maize mainly from silo 's in the Free State by rail to Maputsoe 
and Maseru (Lesotho Milling Company, 1994) . 
Imports, including food aid, constitute over 50 percent of total annual consumption of maize 
in Lesotho. Consumption figures for maize show an average of 126 kilograms per capita for 
the period 1981 - 1993 (Bureau of Statistics, 1994; Austin, 1993 ; Food Management 
Unit, 1994a) . 
3.2.1 Informal sector 
In the informal sector maize is primarily consumed at the household / village level and very 
little enters the formal marketing chain. Maize is ground at home or by hammer millers who 
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charge milling fees . A few surplus producers also sell maize privately or engage in maize 
trade for bartering purposes, particularly in exchange for livestock. Bayley (1993b) and the 
Ministry of Agriculture (1992) report 70 kilogram bags being exchanged for one or two sheep 
in the Highlands (Sheep sold for about R250 each in 1994). 
3.2.2 Formal sector 
Data for the period 1981/82 - 1993/94 show that most households are deficit producers 
(Ministry of Agriculture, 1994a; National Early Warning Unit, 1994a; Food Management 
Unit, 1994a) . Formal maize marketing channels are very limited and there are only three 
mills in Lesotho . The parastatal, Lesotho Flour Mills , milling maize as Lesotho Maize Mill 
in conjunction with a management team from Spillers (UK) since 1986, is located in Maseru. 
Two other mills , Maputsoe Milling and Maseru Roller Mills are both operated under Lesotho 
Milling Company, a partnership between Tiger Oats and the Lesotho National Development 
Corporation (government parastatal). Maseru Roller Mills has been milling maize for 23 
years . The mills process and package maize meal and maize by-products (animal feeds) , 
wheat meal, and sorghum. Lesotho Flour Mills also packages and distributes other 
commodities such as sugar. The bulk of maize processed in the formal sector comes from 
commercial imports and food aid. Both Lesotho Flour Mills and Lesotho Milling Company 
report that less than 10 percent of their intake is from local production. Table 3.1 shows the 
amount of local maize milled and its proportion to all maize milled commercially in the 
period 1987/88 - 1992/93 . 
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Table 3.1: Local versus imported maize milled commercially in Lesotho, 1987/88 - 1992/93. 
YEAR LOCAL IMPORTED TOTAL LOCAL MAIZE 
MAIZE l ) MAIZE2) MAIZE MILLED 
(Tons maize (Tons maize (Tons maize (Percent) 
milled) milled) milled) 
1987/88 8906 83865 92771 9,6 
1988/89 11 156 75305 86461 12,9 
1989/90 8805 89028 97833 9,0 
1990/91 23760 135 703 159 463 14,9 
1991192 3400 132600 136000 2,5 
1992/93 1 593 143 288 144881 1,1 
Sources: 1) Lesotho Milling Company (1994) and Lesotho Flour Mills (1994); 2) Food Management Unit 
(1994a) . 
Lesotho Flour Mills also milled 3 000 tons of donated food aid on behalf of government in 
1988/89 and 4 000 tons in 1989/90 above local intake and commercial imports. Lesotho 
Flour Mills in 1991/92 received direct commercial imports from Zimbabwe. Lesotho Milling 
Company has not processed any food aid in the past five years and receives direct commercial 
imports through the South African Maize Board and its agents. Maize throughput at Lesotho 
Flour Mills has been rising since the mill's inception (1986) with a 39 percent per year 
increase from 1988/89 - 1992/93 (Lesotho Flour Mills, 1994). Annual turnover increased 
from R78,67 to R164,17 million over the same period. Sugar packing, wheat processing, 
animal feeds production and other operations contribute more to Lesotho Flour Mill's revenue 
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than maize milling. Revenues from the processing of maize averaged only 6,35 percent of 
turnover over the five year period considered. 
At the Lesotho Milling Company's Maputsoe mill, throughput of maize in the years 1989/90 
to 1992/93 varied from 50 532 to 67 342 tons. Annual turnover over that period rose 
steadily from R34,64 to R60 million. Maize revenue averaged 94,3 percent of overall 
turnover over the four year period . For the Lesotho Milling Company's Maseru Roller Mills 
annual maize throughput and revenue averaged about 25 000 tons and R23 million 
respectively from 1990/91 - 1992/93, with maize revenue averaging 96 percent of total 
revenue (Lesotho Milling Company, 1994). Table 3.2 summarises annual throughput and 
turnover for the commercial mills. 
Table 3.2 Maize throughput and annual turnover (R million) of maize mills in Lesotho, 1988/89 - 1992/93. 
YEAR Lesotho Flour Mills Lesotho Milling Company 
Maputsoe Mills Maseru Roller Mills 
Maize Turnover Maize Turnover Maize Turnover 
Milled (R mill) Milled (R mill) Milled (R mill) 
(Tons) (Tons) (Tons) 
1988/89 16 171 78,669 ****** ****** ****** ****** 
1989/90 ****** 103 ,127 57821 34,644 ****** ****** 
1990/91 60059 115 ,775 50532 34,951 26409 23,458 
1991 /92 80869 149,795 65749 52,364 23804 24,218 
1992/93 85641 164,171 67342 60,000 21 537 22,590 
****** Indicates that these figures were not available. 
Sources: Lesotho Flour Mills (1994) and Lesotho Milling Company (1994). 
Based on 1992/93 figures, Lesotho Flour Mills produced 49,1 percent, Maputsoe Mill 38,6 
percent and Maseru Roller Mills 12,3 percent of commercially milled maize meal in Lesotho. 
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Both Lesotho Flour Mills and Lesotho Milling Company are reluctant to expand purchases 
of domestic maize because of high transaction costs , relatively high local prices and 
inconsistent quality compared to maize from the South African Maize Board. Local 
producers supply irregular and small quantities of maize and often have to travel long 
distances to reach the commercial mills . The government stipulates that all domestic maize 
delivered to the mills must be bought (Motsamai, 1994) . Co-op Lesotho (prior to the 
1992/1993 marketing year) and other traders buy locally produced maize at the legislated 
price and sell it to the mills at the government gazetted price (Legal Notice No 142 of 1992) , 
as do farmers who deliver to the mills. The price offered by Co-op Lesotho to farmers was 
the price set for traders . Private traders are known to offer more than this price (Ministry 
of Agriculture, 1992), but they rarely buy in maize with the intention of selling to the 
commercial mills. Bayley (1993b) and Motsamai (1994) suggest that private traders are not 
convinced that the price they receive from the mills for delivery of maize is sufficient 
incentive compared with higher expected returns from informal market sales. Co-op Lesotho , 
after incurring trading losses for over a decade, was closed during the 1992/93 marketing 
year in terms of Structural Adjustment Programme clauses to reduce government expenditures 
and sell non-profitable parastatals (Ministry of Agriculture, 1994b). 
All of the commercial maize meal produced is sold locally. Reports of illegal imports of both 
maize grain and meal are common. The commercial mills have challenged certain stores and 
border controls (posts where they suspect or have information that maize grain/meal is 
entering the country) over import infringements . Only the Lesotho Government, through the 
Department of Economics and Marketing , can legally issue import trading licences and 
permits for commercial and non-commercial uses of maize . Imports are restricted to maize 
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grain. The areas adjacent to South Africa are not closely policed as customs officials rarely 
search and there are large sections without border controls, so maize import regulations can 
be avoided . High internal transportation costs make illegal maize meal imports from South 
Africa cheaper than the locally milled maize. Inconsistent supply and the lack of available 
credit place constraints on the trading of local maize meal. Lesotho Milling Company only 
makes bulk deliveries upwards of eight tons and extends only limited credit to traders. 
Discounts are available only to large buyers. Where infrastructure is well-established, the 
mill delivers to all 10 districts of Lesotho. 
The new maize marketing system operating in South Africa since 1 May 1995 has not altered 
existing formal trade arrangements and marketing opportunities with Lesotho . While maize 
can now be traded freely within South Africa, with market-related regional pricing replacing 
the old cross-subsidized "single-price" system, the South African Maize Board remains the 
sole exporter of maize. The commercial mills in Lesotho therefore still cannot buy directly 
from South African producers and agents. 
3.2.3 Marketing opportunities 
Most local producers in Lesotho can sell their grain either to the mills (formal) or to informal 
buyers (other households and local traders / millers) . Surplus producing households with 
large quantities of maize grain participate in the formal market as suppliers when they sell 
to the mills, particularly immediately after harvest. This is probably due to 1) a cash need 
after harvest as farmers cannot wait to sell on the informal market once home grown grains 
have been consumed; 2) a need to repay bank financed Food Self Sufficiency Programme 
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loans or loans for contractor services; and 3) high transaction costs (storage, handling, etc) 
which make formal producer prices competitive with the informal price (Bayley , 1993b) . 
Reasons 1 and 3 suggest that the informal market price after harvest is low and closely 
approximates the formal market clearing price . Selling to the formal sector is thus the most 
attractive economic option for large surplus producers whose supply is net of own subsistence 
needs. These conditions plus the producer price determine the quantity of grain sold to the 
mills and the quantity sold to the informal market. 
For grain deficit producers (most households), grain can be obtained by either purchasing 
commercial maize meal from traders and retailers , and/or buying grain on the informal 
market. Bayley (1993b) and the Ministry of Agriculture (1992) contend that in most areas 
the price of maize grain tends to approach the retail price of refined maize (RP) minus 
informal milling costs (MC). Due to the availability of commercial meal , (RP - MC) 
effectively becomes a ceiling price for transactions within the informal market. Supply of 
maize at this price is perfectly elastic to rural consumers . Maize suppliers will sell at the 
market clearing price as determined by local demand conditions. Trade flows of local maize 
grain are limited to the period just after harvest. Hence, there is an inflow of commercial 
maize meal to grain deficit areas despite local consumer preferences for coarser (local) maize 
meal . 
3.3 Price setting, margins and controls 
Farmer representatives, officials from the Ministry of Agriculture and senior personnel from 
Lesotho Flour Mills and Lesotho Milling Company are involved in setting prices at different 
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levels in the maize marketing system. Farmer representatives in the major producing districts 
are nominated by field extension staff and have to be approved by the Ministry . 
3.3.1 Producer price 
Producer prices are set by the Ministry of Agriculture for producers who deliver to the three 
commercial mills. Prices are also set for deliveries to trading stores by calculating handling 
charges plus a variable margin - dependent on the import parity price which is based on the 
South African Maize Board price (Motsamai, 1994; Bayley, 1993b) , and local production 
costs. The producer price is based primarily on local production costs derived from cost 
calculations made by the Food Self Sufficiency Programme and quoted contractor prices. 
These price calculations are determined by the Ministry of Agriculture and farmer 
representatives (Motsamai, 1994) , and then published and gazetted by the Minister of 
Agriculture before the planting season. Uniform or pan-territorial pricing strategies have 
been used for the whole country. This system benefits producers in surplus areas who 
otherwise would receive lower prices (Masters , 1993). 
Real maize producer prices have declined steadily in the last ten years from around R430 per 
ton to just under R350 per ton in 1994 (1989 = 100). This is largely due to falling real 
prices of maize grain imports from South Africa which are used as a reference , and pressure 
on government from the three mills to not support high local producer prices 
(Motsamai , 1994) .. South African producer prices have consistently been lower than Lesotho 
producer prices and direct cross-border purchases from South African farmers would allow 
Lesotho buyers to acquire cheaper grain. However, the new South African regulations 
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stipulate that the South African Maize Board remains the sole exporter of maize. 
3.3.2 Informal miller price 
Informal millers do not have their prices set by government. In 1992 a study carried out by 
the Department of Economics and Marketing in Lesotho showed average informal milling 
costs to vary from R1,00 to R2,50 per 12,5 - 15 kilogram container (Ministry of 
Agriculture, 1992). Informal millers in both urban and rural areas can buy directly from 
local farmers without their buying and selling prices being monitored or enforced by the 
government. 
3.3.3 Formal miller and consumer prices 
3.3.3.1 Mill-gate price 
The government consults with miller personnel on maize milling margins and then determines 
and legislates the mill-gate price (Lesotho Milling Company, 1994) . Prices are based on the 
border parity price , costs of production (for local producers and reflected in the producer 
price) , processing, refining and packaging , plus what Motsamai (1994) and Lesotho Flour 
Mills (1994) claim is a 10 - 15 percentage mark-up . Border parity pricing is necessary, since 
the bulk of grains milled is imported from South Africa. The mills' transport and 
procurement costs are in respect of imports. Quoted transport figures per ton for 1991192 
and 1992/93 for Lesotho Flour Mills were R38 ,91 and R44,20 compared to R48,00 and 
R67,00 for Lesotho Milling Company. Some of these discrepancies are due to Lesotho 
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Milling Company reporting mean transport costs for two mills at two different locations 
(Lesotho Milling Company, 1994). 
Lesotho mill-gate prices for maize meal have generally declined in real terms since 1983/84. 
In 1984/85 the price was a high of R637,37 per ton, dropping to a low of R441,40 per ton 
in 1993/94 (1989 = 100). The trend is similar for smaller volumes of maize meal. South 
African mill-gate prices appear to have declined over a comparative period, from R712,25 
per ton (1981182) to R674,7 1 (1993/94) per ton (Directorate of Agricultural Information, 
1994), as the South African Maize Board has paid lower net producer prices which reflect 
export losses (Vigne, 1995; Wright, 1992; Wright and Nieuwoudt, 1993) . The mill selling 
price in South Africa, prior to the 1995 policy change, covered South African Maize Board 
prices, agents' costs, milling costs and mill profit margins. 
The Lesotho government gives de facto monopoly powers and subsidies (effected through 
amendments and bills provided by the 1967 Marketing Act) to both Lesotho Milling Company 
and Lesotho Flour Mills. There are no reported figures to show the extent of subsidization, 
but the total level of subsidy is estimated in Table 3.3 by the difference between South 
African and Lesotho mill-gate prices. The rationale is that the alternative to purchasing 
locally milled maize meal would be to import maize meal from South Africa. The estimates 
are a lower limit as transport costs have been ignored. The estimated total level of subsidies 
has risen in real terms (1989 = 100) since 1989/90, and for the 1992/93 season was some 
R38,05 million (assuming estimated mill throughput of 174550 tons). Subsidy amounts are 
estimated after converting 80 kilograms of sifted maize meal to a one ton equivalent. Under 
the Customs Union agreement, the movement of goods and services between Lesotho and 
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South Africa is not subject to any tariffs, taxes or trade barriers . 
Table 3.3 Estimated Lesotho government subsidies to mills, 1989/90 - 1993/94, in real 
terms (1989 = 100). 
YEAR SA Mill-gate LESOTHO Mill-gate Estimated real 
real price * real price SUBSIDY 
Rlton Rlton Rlton 
1989/90 713,60 585 ,77 127,83 
1990/91 718,63 576,91 141,72 
1991192 705,44 563 ,20 142,24 
1992/93 705,78 487,79 217,99 
1993/94 674,71 441,50 233,21 
* Converted 80 kilogram sifted maize meal to a one ton equivalent. 
Source: Directorate of Agricultural Information (1994), Bureau of Statistics (1994), and 
Department of Economics and Marketing (1994). 
Close to 100 percent of the commercial grain market in Lesotho is controlled by Lesotho 
Milling Company and Lesotho Flour Mills . Informal millers and the general public cannot 
make direct bulk purchases without import licences that are limited at the discretion of the 
issuer, normally the District Marketing Officer (Legal Notice 78 of 1992). For the period 
July 1992 to June 1993 permits were granted to the general public to import 5 395 tons of 
maize (barely 2,9 percent of commercial grain consumption) compared to 184 050 tons by 
the commercial mills (Department of Economics and Marketing, 1994; Bayley, 1993b) . 
Informal mills probably continue to exist due to 1) indigenous rural and some urban 
preference for coarser maize meal; 2) convenience with respect to time and location; and 3) 
lower direct milling costs (Motsamai, 1994; Bayley, 1993). 
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3.3.3.2 Consumer price 
Since 1988 retailers and wholesalers have been free to determine their own prices for maize 
meal , except in 1992 when a severe drought was experienced and government set the price . 
Consumer prices for maize meal, taken from Bureau of Statistics CPI estimates for 12,5 
kilogram and 2,5 kilogram quantities, declined in real terms between 1988/89 - 1993/94. For 
the 12,5 kilogram unit, prices dropped from R8,99 to R7,60 (or 15,46 percent) over the five 
year period. A direct comparison between real consumer prices in Lesotho and South Africa 
shows that Lesotho consumer prices have fallen from R719,20 per ton to R608,00 per ton, 
whilst South African consumer prices have remained fairly constant at around R1 080 per ton 
(1990 = 100) (Directorate of Agricultural Information, 1994) . Over the past five years, the 
differences between consumer prices in Lesotho and South Africa have grown, with South 
African consumer prices being higher. The Lesotho government's subsidy to the mills and 
the withdrawal of maize subsidies in South Africa from 1993 probably explain these 
differences. In real terms South African Maize Board prices fell at a slower rate than South 
African producer prices and the Maize Board - producer price margin increased, due to the 
need to finance export losses (Faminow and Laubscher, 1991 ; Directorate of Agricultural 
Information, 1994). 
3.4 Conclusions 
Lesotho is likely to remain a net importer of maize grain in the medium to long term, as over 
50 percent of total annual grain consumption is made up of imports . This situation has not 
been reversed despite major investments and capital infusions made in the 1980's to increase 
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food self-sufficiency in maize. Maize pricing and marketing policy measures to support food 
self-sufficiency initiative have had the following impact. Net real producer prices have 
declined in real terms over the last ten years and most farmers remain net deficit producers. 
Farmers producing small surplus quantities of maize grain for sale generally sell to the local 
informal market. Efforts have been made to change the producer price setting mechanism -
based on cost of production and border parity pricing criteria - by using improved cost of 
production estimates, with a shift from data supplied by the Technical Operations Unit of the 
Ministry of Agriculture to estimates from individual farm machinery operators. Costs for 
inputs are no longer based on Co-op Lesotho prices but on prices from private sector input 
suppliers (Ministry of Agriculture, 1994b) . 
Lesotho production cost estimates are, however , difficult to obtain since production is 
influenced by different production systems, technological and environmental conditions. 
Costs that influence farmer decisions (opportunity costs) are subjective (Takavarasha, cited 
in Krishna, 1990), and basing price supports on cost of production is not a justifiable concept 
(Pasour, 1980; Belongia, 1983). 
At the mill-gate level, the most important factor is the border parity pnce, as most 
commercially milled maize is sourced from South African Maize Board exports. The South 
African Maize Board export price affects the Lesotho government's decisions on both maize 
milling margins and mill-gate prices in Lesotho. Government pricing policies also prevent 
competition between mills, and reduce trader and wholesaler competition for market share . 
If maize prices are to remain affordable to Lesotho consumers when most households are 
deficit producers and government subsidy costs are rising, the present one-channel marketing 
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system and administered price structure are possibly inappropriate. It may be possible, for 
example, to obtain maize grain at relatively lower prices directly from South African farmers , 
but this would have to be negotiated with the South African Maize Board. Consumers and 
traders should be allowed to trade and market maize grain in an open market system with less 
restrictive interregional maize movement (remove restrictive licensing). More competition 
would be stimulated between the three major mills and local hammer mills by removing 
quantity controls on maize grain imports . 
Local consumers would have a wider range of product choice and sources if trade was 
deregulated . There WOUld , however, be a trade-off between deregulation of maize marketing 
and the removal of price controls and government subsidies. The expected maize meal price 
increases when subsidies are removed would be partly offset by expected price reductions due 
to more competition and less control on grain imports . Government (taxpayers) would benefit 
from reduced subsidies and less administrative procedures required to police, monitor and 
regulate maize pricing and marketing . 
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CHAPTER 4 
FOOD AID DEPENDENCY IN LESOTHO: ISSUES AND CONSIDERATIONS 
4.1 Introduction 
Food aid is a form of food commodity transfer from one country or organization known as 
the donor, to a recipient country or agency (Jones, 1977) on a totally grant basis or on highly 
concessional terms (Food and Agriculture Organization, 1994). This type of aid has become 
a permanent feature of international assistance from the developed world to developing 
nations (Cathie, 1982). Isenman and Singer (1977) point out that the primary aim of food 
aid is to feed the hungry, particularly the nutritionally vulnerable, without significantly 
increasing government budgetary support. This creates an income transfer by raising real 
incomes and savings of low-income households who allocate proportionally more income to 
food grains and less to savings. Food as a form of aid has been used in a variety of ways, 
impacting mainly on nutrition, consumer prices and agricultural production, particularly in 
less developing countries (Cathie, 1982; Mellor, 1984; Stevens, 1979) . These impacts may 
be direct or indirect, though difficulties arise in making distinctions (Stevens, 1979). 
This chapter analyzes the issues relevant to food aid dependency in Lesotho, particularly the 
link to food security and their policy implications . Lesotho has a long history of food aid 
beginning in the 1930's, when it was last self-sufficient in the staple grains, but it only started 
to receive large quantities of food aid in 1966 to cope with the serious drought (Jones, 1977), 
and the trend has since persisted. The need to investigate the role of food aid in Lesotho's 
economy is that the economic and political environment has in the three decades since 
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Lesotho's independence undergone tremendous transformations. The most significant of these 
are : 1) the democratization of South Africa which has reduced world sympathy and support 
for Lesotho which was perceived to be isolated within a hostile environment; 2) failure to 
transform the Lesotho economy and increase agricultural growth; 3) changing donor countries 
agendas due to internal political and economic pressures , resulting in calls to reduce or 
reform their aid contributions . 
Past food aid studies in Lesotho did not focus on the food security aspect of this aid . Jones 
(1977) investigated how food aid to Lesotho was administered, and in particular the United 
Kingdom' s role in granting food aid to Lesotho. Austin (1993) studied the contribution of 
food aid to cereal supply and utilization, focusing on the its impacts on nutrition and the 
nutritional status of Lesotho households. The intervention of food aid was important in 
maintaining vulnerable groups . Cathie (1982) used Lesotho as a case study of the political 
economy of food aid , whilst Stevens (1979) used Lesotho as an example of how such aid can 
be supplied and used by a recipient developing country. Nziramasanga (1987) investigated 
food aid within the Southern African region and its role in trade and economic development, 
but ignored Lesotho . Tola (1988) considered food security issues facing Lesotho in the late 
1980's. He argued that food reserves should be guaranteed (through food aid and commercial 
purchases) , and that the Lesotho government should increase production of staple grains since 
the political climate in the 1980's created some doubt as to whether South Africa would 
continue to provide staple food supplies . 
Long term reliance on food aid is problematic since there is no guarantee of support from the 
donor community . Lesotho 's balance of payments and trade deficit cannot assure continued 
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and sustained commercial imports from either South Africa, Zimbabwe or the European 
Union. Production of maize surpluses in South Africa may decline if real maize prices there 
continue to fall. 
4.2 Food aid objectives 
Most food aid is provided on the basis of bilateral agreements that are largely influenced by 
political considerations (C;athie, 1982) and world responses to dramatic food shortages (Food 
and Agriculture Organization, 1985) . Foreign aid in general can be said to combine altruistic 
activities along with political and economic investment considerations (~instrup-Anderson 
et ai, 1995). Food aid arose primarily as a response to the surplus disposal programme of ---
the United States of America in the 1950's, and has evolved conceptually, politically and 
institutionally. Food aid made it possible to: 1) dispose of surpluses (mainly cereals); 2) form 
a mechanism of exchange between orderers and disposers of surpluses whilst attempting not 
to cause harmful disruptions and interfere with normal patterns of production and international 
trade; and 3) find a consultative approach for governments with respect to engaging in food 
transfers (Food and Agriculture Organization, 1985). 
Food aid in the sub-Saharan African context is now typically seen as a means to enhance food 
security - a situation in which the people of a country reliably receive all the food they 
require for normal health all the time (World Bank, 1986: 216). The conceptual evolution 
of food aid, particularly towards its role in combating food insecurity, stemmed from the use 
of food surpluses in: 1) food for work projects; 2) the stabilization of food supplies; 3) 
specialized feeding programmes aimed at vulnerable target groups; and 4) subsidization of 
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new food uses . Food aid can be used indirectly to provide support or as an incentive to 
initiatives for community and economic development. Mellor (1984) concludes that food aid 
can and does improve food security by providing the means of protection and ways to raise 
the dietary status, nutrition and consumption of the poor. Cathie (1982) refers to food aid 
being used for additionality, whereby it adds to overall consumption by the poor (diets and 
nutrition are improved) . The additionality principle is supported by agencies and 
organizations that focus on low income households and vulnerable groups as recipients of 
food aid. 
The donor community is increasingly programming food aid policy to support or be consistent 
with other forms of development aid (Clay and Benson, 1990), without necessarily increasing 
the amount of aid. There have been clear signs of donor reluctance to provide food aid as 
part of development assistance, with world figures of food aid as a percentage of overseas 
development aid dropping from 11,7 in 1981 to 5,4 percent in 1992 (Food and Agriculture 
Organisation, 1994). Aid has now also been tied to economic and political reforms. The 
lack of individual country support of programmes initiated by the developed nations and 
international institutions may lead to reduced total aid for developing countries. It has been 
described by some as a sense of hopelessness due to lack of progress in development or 
reduced dependence on aid (Ministry of Agriculture, 1994b; Food Management Unit, 1994b). 
Many donor states, after years of slow economic growth, pressures to reduce their own 
subsidies to agriculture , the worldwide movement to freer trade and less control, are less 
eager or able to act as willing donors (Ministry of Agriculture, 1994b) . In the United States, 
like much of Europe, there is growing internal political pressure to reduce foreign aid and 
to concentrate on local interests . In Lesotho, the democratization effort of the 1990's, 
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culminating in an elected government, can in part be explained by donor pressure on the then 
military regime of impending cuts in foreign aid , including food (Sechaba, 1995) . 
Transfers have traditionally been in the form of food - primarily cereals (maize grain, flour, 
wheat, rice) - or convertible currencies for barter or 'swap ' arrangements (Clay and Benson, 
1990) . The flow of aid has traditionally been from the developed Western countries , 
including Japan and Australasia, to the developing cOUlitries of Latin America and sub-
Saharan Africa. 
4.3 Food aid in Lesotho 
4.3.1 Background 
Food aid substitutes for the food gap experienced by countries due to their inability to 
produce or import enough commercial imports to meet residual local demand. The important 
food question in Lesotho is whether Lesotho imports enough food to make up the shortfall 
in production, an amount equivalent to about 60 percent of national consumption annually 
(Ministry of Agriculture, 1994a; Bureau of Statistics , 1994) . Due to the high incidence of 
poverty (said to affect over 26 percent of the population) and poor natural physical resources , 
Lesotho has over the years developed a system of reliance on continual cereal importation. 
Because cereals constitute over 75 percent of the national diet in Lesotho (National Early 
Warning Unit, 1993a) , "food security" in the Lesotho context refers to "staple cereal food 
security" (National Early Warning Unit, 1993b). 
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Commercial imports of cereals are authorized by the Government of Lesotho through 
purchases of maize from the South African Maize Board and wheat from the world market. 
Imports are arranged by the commercial mills (Lesotho Flour Mills and Lesotho Milling 
Company which includes Maseru Roller Mills), but are never sufficient to cover effective 
demand (National Early Warning Unit, 1994a; Ministry of Agriculture, 1994b; Cekwane, 
1995). Effective demand is defined as the desire of consumers to buy, combined with their 
ability to pay for, cereals they want or need (Takavarasha, 1993). Therefore, the Lesotho 
government and food aid agencies supplement supply requirements with food aid which is 
clearly used for additionality purposes (although some aid, such as wheat sold onto the 
commercial market through Lesotho Flour Mills, is not in this category). 
Food aid contributions to Lesotho are the combined efforts of foreign governments, 
organizations and agencies, most notably the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID), the European Union (20 000 tons of maize in 1993/94), the World 
Food Programme of the United Nations, and the United Kingdom mostly through the Save 
the Children Fund (50 000 tons of maize in 1993/94). The largest contributor to the World 
Food Programme component for Lesotho has generally been Japan. Other agencies include 
the United Nations International Children and Education Fund, and the World Health 
Organization (WHO) who distribute food to schools and provide supplements for pregnant 
mothers and undernourished children under six years of age. 
Since Lesotho's main staple is white maize and most world surplus stocks used as aid consist 
of wheat or yellow maize, most of the food aid sent to Lesotho is white maize purchased 
from South Africa or Zimbabwe in terms of tri-Iateral agreements (Food Management Unit, 
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1994b) over and above commercial imports from these countries. These tri-Iateral 
arrangements are a recent development, as Zimbabwe previously did not export substantially 
within the region and donor nations were prohibited from dealing with South Africa. Gay 
et al . (1994) indicate that about 49 percent of Lesotho's population can be categorized as 
poor, with a further 26 percent as below the poverty level (consume respectively less than 
half and a quarter of the diet requirements of an average healthy adult equivalent, calculated 
at R140,96 per month based on a 1993 Baseline survey). Some 75 percent of Lesotho's 
population thus can technically qualify for food aid in Lesotho . 
4.3.2 Food aid management 
The targeting and distribution of food aid has large internal and external transportation and 
transactions (handling , storage) costs . The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) (1985) 
estimates these to be about two thirds of the cost, including insurance and freight (cit) , of 
food transported in some sub-Saharan African countries . Data collected from the Food 
Management Unit in Lesotho show cost estimates for white maize grain of RO,41 per kg in 
1990 and RO,58 per kg in 1993 for transport and transactions costs, while consumer prices 
of sifted maize meal were RO, 62 per kg in 1990 and RO, 71 per kg in 1993 . These prices also 
reflect the subsidies provided by the government to commercial mills and to consumers 
through price controls. These figures represent actual prices quoted from the Ministry of 
Agriculture to the World Food Programme (Food Management Unit, 1992; 1994c) . Freight 
figures in 1990 for railage from South African ports into Lesotho were RO,99 per kg (Food 
Management Unit, 1992). 
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Prior to the lifting of sanctions in South Africa, food aid was purchased or delivered from 
Europe, and North and South America. In 1990, freighted costs of food aid were 33 percent 
higher than for commercially imported maize, derived from landed cost figures to the mills 
(Lesotho Flour Mills, 1994). The Lesotho government takes delivery of food aid landed in 
its silos and recovers costs for delivery (donors absorb transport and transaction costs) (Food 
Management Unit, 1994a; 1992). 
Aid must often be accompanied by institutional support, technical assistance and the policy 
capacity to integrate it into a holistic food security framework. Food aid in Lesotho is 
handled through government authorized institutions, primarily the Food Management Unit, 
located within the Ministry of Agriculture (but responsible to the Office of the Prime 
Minister). At various times in the past, aid has been managed under different 
ministries/institutions, but there has always been a centralized distribution office, which 
Stevens (1979) attributes to the political sensitivity of food aid. 
Since 1992, the Food Management Unit has worked directly with the Drought Relief 
Implementation Group whose mandate includes the identification of vulnerable groups and 
the distribution of food. These groups work directly with aid agencies spearheaded in 
Lesotho by the World Food Programme, USAID, the European Union, and Overseas 
Development Agency of the United Kingdom. Also included are the Cooperative of Relief 
Everywhere (CARE), the Catholic Relief Services (CRS), various other church organizations 
and non-governmental organizations such as the Save the Children Fund. Some of these 
institutions do not physically handle food aid or make direct contributions, but ensure delivery 
from the Food Management Unit stores to distribution points around the country . Private 
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agencies , institutions and traders have also been involved in food distribution but the ultimate 
responsibility of targeting lies with the Food Management Unit. This unit is helped by 
nutrition assistants in the districts, health workers , chiefs and extension agents in identifying 
vulnerable groups and households. These cases are listed on a roll that is controlled at the 
village and ward level. Cases are placed on or taken off the roll at the discretion of the 
identifying bodies, who are also responsible for verifying data and ensuring aid reaches target 
groups . 
Food aid can be classified as programme aid (to assist in programmes or for sectoral support) 
and project aid (for specific projects). Lesotho receives both programme and project aid and 
often the donor chooses the type of aid provided; for example, some of the ODA aid 
comprises "food- for-work" projects that assist in conservation works and tree planting . 
4.4 Food aid issues in Lesotho 
Food aid issues relate to the effects of such aid on domestic food production, food prices and 
human nutrition (!senman and Singer, 1977). The impact of food aid in Lesotho is reflected 
by trends in cereal self-sufficiency , producer and consumer food prices and nutrition and 
consumption patterns. 
4.4.1 Cereal self-sufficiency indices 
Prior to the 1930's Lesotho was a net exporter of food, but today it is a large net importer 
of food (Swallow et ai, 1988; Jones, 1977) , highly dependent on food aid and commercial 
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maize imports from South Africa. Food self-sufficiency indices for maize and wheat remain 
very low, meaning that Lesotho produces a low level of its national requirements . Table 4.1 
shows Lesotho's self-sufficiency indices for major cereals over the period 1983/84 to 
1992/93 . The difference between domestic production and total supply shows the substantial 
contribution of imports and donated food . 
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Table 4.1 Cereal self-sufficiency indices, food aid and commercial grain imports to Lesotho, 1983/84 to 1992/93. 
-
Year 1983/84 1984/85 1985/86 1986/87 1987/88 1988/89 1989/90 1990/91 1991192 1992/93 
Domestic Production (1 000 tons) 
M 79 ,4 92,4 86,5 94 ,9 159,7 137,2 171 ,6 48,9 61 ,1 45 ,0 
W 17,1 10,4 11 ,0 18 ,5 19,2 29,7 33 ,2 7 ,0 11,9 8,9 
S 33 ,8 54,8 33 ,5 31 ,2 53 ,4 31,1 36,1 10,0 19,5 11 ,0 
Commercial Imports (1 000 tons) 
M 94 ,9 99,8 102,3 97 ,9 110,5 106,9 158,3 131 ,7 110,0 152,9 
W 31 ,8 32 ,0 32,0 32 ,0 41 ,4 54,2 37 ,1 56,8 25 ,0 60 ,5 
S 1,0 1,0 1,0 1,0 3,4 0,5 0,9 1,7 0,0 0,0 
Food Aid (1 000 tons) 
M 9 ,0 15,0 15,0 15,0 20,5 19,8 10,9 10,4 37 ,0 30,6 
W 20,6 30 ,7 31,0 31 ,0 42,9 16,2 8,6 15 ,0 28 ,0 10,0 
S 0,0 0 ,0 0,0 0,0 0,9 0 ,0 0 ,0 0,0 0 ,0 0,0 
Total Supply (1 000 tons) 
M 183,3 207,2 203 ,8 207,8 290,7 263,9 340,8 191 ,0 208 ,1 228 ,5 
, 
W 69,5 73 ,1 74,0 81 ,5 103,5 100,1 78,9 78 ,8 64,9 79,4 
S 35 ,1 55 ,8 34,5 32 ,2 57 ,7 31 ,6 37,0 11 ,7 19,5 11 ,0 
Self-Sufficiency Index (Domestic productionltotal supply) as a percentage 
M 43 45 42 46 55 52 50 26 29 20 
W 25 14 15 23 19 30 42 9 17 II 
S 96 98 97 97 93 98 98 91 100 100 
Food Aid 1 Commercial imports plus Food aid (as a percentage) 
All 19 26 25 26 29 18 9 12 33 16 
Source: Agricultural Situation Report (1994) ; National Food Security Data-book (1993); and Bureau of Statistics (1994). 
* All figures in whole maize grain equivalent. 
Key : M = Maize ; W = Wheat: S = Sorghum; All = All three cereals 
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Average maize self-sufficiency over the period 1983/84 to 1992/93 was 40,6 percent and the 
last three years of that period show a sharp decline in the index, which extends beyond the 
drought in 1991/92. The situation with wheat and sorghum is somewhat different. Very little 
wheat is produced locally , whilst very little sorghum is imported . The reasons why Basotho 
farmers produce wheat and sorghum have not been thoroughly investigated, but subsidies and 
price supports have not been as comprehensive as for maize . Whilst there is evidence that 
wheat was previously grown extensively (Sechaba, 1995), with Lesotho a net exporter before 
the 1930's, the reasons for sorghum production over time being close to self-sufficiency need 
further study. Data on comparative yield statistics show that sorghum has performed better 
than maize under Lesotho's climatic conditions (Ministry of Agriculture, 1994a; Food 
Management Unit, 1994a) as it is more drought resistant. The government also encourages 
agencies to explore more uses for sorghum (Ministry of Agriculture, 1994b). It is expected 
that sorghum production and consumption may increase under prevailing conditions 
(Government of Lesotho, 1992; Ministry of Agriculture, 1991). 
Poor overall returns to agriculture as a result of falling yields have been evident for quite 
some time in Lesotho, with per capita food production declining from about 120 kg in 1969 
to about 65 kg in 1992 (Central Bank, 1994). Population growth, lower soil fertility levels 
and a declining arable land base drawing less suitable land into production, have all 
contributed to a lack of production gains . This decline has occurred despite greater 
investments in agriculture and concerted efforts by govefIlIl)ent to promote food self-
sufficiency (Government of Lesotho, 1992; Sechaba, 1995). Food production projections 
appear dismal and are compounded by a declining arable land base from 13 percent prior to 
1980 (Stevens, 1979) to an estimated 8 percent by the year 2001 (Sechaba, 1995) . This 
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decline will be precipitated by further soil erosion and land encroachment from urban and 
rural settlements. The pace of land reforms and land management practices that can possibly 
arrest this development is very slow (for example, implementation of the 1979 Land Act and 
subsequent revisions of that Act, and the failure to continue implementation of the Grazing 
Fee and Grazing Control legislation), with successive governments apparently lacking either 
the political will or power to implement the recommended reforms (Phororo, 1995; Food 
Studies Group; 1995). The government has lacked the full cooperation of various 
stakeholder's such as Chiefs, Grazing Associations , and rural households, and the judicial and 
policing mechanism's and powers to enforce such legislation when passed (Phororo, 1995; 
Department of Economics and Marketing, 1995) . Estimated average domestic production 
by the year 2001 will be 113 000 tons of cereal which would barely feed 25 percent of the 
estimated population (Sechaba, 1995). 
Over the years, consistent shortfalls in local production have necessitated commercial and 
food aid imports as shown in Table 4.1. Food aid between 1983/84 and 1992/93 averaged 
about 21 percent of (all commercial imports plus food aid) supplements to domestic cereal 
outputs, so it seems unlikely that Lesotho will be independent of food aid in the long term. 
4.4.2 Impact of food aid on producer and consumer prices 
Whilst food aid is only one component in the complex process of improving food security, 
it may be used in a favourable policy environment that ensures a proper balance between 
technical and financial resources required to have a self-reliant food economy (Food and 
Agriculture Organization, 1985). Real maize producer prices have declined steadily in the 
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last decade from around R430 per ton to just under R350 per ton in 1994 (1989 = 100). The 
decline in producer prices is largely due to falling real prices of maize grain imports from 
South Africa which are used as a reference, and pressure on government from the commercial 
mills to not support high local producer prices . Producer prices for maize, wheat and 
sorghum in Lesotho are legislated as are maize and wheat mill prices . 
Consumer prices for cereals in Lesotho have been declining in real terms partly due to 
government food price policies and legislation (Makenete et aI, 1996). Furthermore, real 
maize prices have declined in South Africa (1988/89 to 1993/94) which is the major source 
of Lesotho 's maize imports (Food Management Unit, 1994a; Lesotho Flour Mills , 1994; 
Lesotho Milling company, 1994) . The correlation between food aid and producer and 
consumer prices has not been established since the main reference point for producer prices 
is the border parity price, whilst for cereal prices it is the border price plus mill margin. The 
fall in real maize prices in South Africa would have aJfected the border parity price . 
Fluctuations in food aid contributions were not correlated with relatively stable, but declining , 
real producer and consumer maize prices. Consumer prices for maize meal fell in real terms 
for the period 1988/89 to 1993/94 from R8,99 to R7 ,60 per 12,5 kg . Data are available only 
for this period from the Bureau of Statistics . Figure 4.1 plots consumer prices versus food 
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FIGURE 4.1 Maize Food Aid Impact on ConsumerMaize 
Meal Prices (April 1989 = 100) 
Source: Bureau of statistics (1994) and National 
Early Warning unit (1993b). 
76 
Food aid appears to have had little effect on both the producer price for maize grain and on 
the consumer price of maize meal in Lesotho . Government setting of producer and mill gate 
prices that influence consumer prices has probably distorted the adjustment of consumer 
prices in response to food aid . Government determines how much aid should be received 
through direct appeals to the donor community after considering the commercial mills ' ability 
to provide maize meal for the internal market. Increased demand for maize · should translate 
into higher consumer prices and producer prices, resulting in increased production and less 
reliance on aid (Nziramasanga, 1987) . Mokitimi (1994) has shown that producer (supply) 
responses to producer price and other incentives such as subsidized inputs and credit have 
been poor. Constraints such as small farm size, poor climate, and low soil fertility have 
contributed towards the stagnation of local food production, with better opportunities from 
off farm earnings . Most agricultural production in Lesotho is for subsistence; most farmers 
are deficit producers (net consumers). Thus, increased demand is met through commercial 
imports and food aid. 
4.4.3 Impact of food aid on nutrition and consumption 
Existing consumption patterns indicate that overall per capita levels are declining for cereals 
from about 180 kg in 1981 to about 120 kg per person in 1990 (Bureau of Statistics, 1994; 
Ministry of Agriculture, 1994a) . Figure 4.2 illustrates consumption patterns of cereals and 
maize over the years 1981 to 1993. Maize production relative to consumption over the period 
1981 to 1993 shows a declining trend . 
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According to FAO and WHO food energy requirements, a person needs 2100 calories of 
cereal amount equivalent of energy per day for a healthy and sustainable diet (National Early 
Warning Unit, 1993a). Of this, 78 percent can be derived solely from cereals (FAO Food 
Balance Sheet cited in National Early Warning Unit, 1993b), which is equivalent to 597 870 
kilocalories per annum. 
In 1973174, between 180 000 and 190 000 people out of a resident population of 950 000 
relied on food aid, which accounted for 25 to 35 percent of net cereal imports (Jones, 
1977:205-206). Based on data collected by Mokotjo (1990:204-211), about 140000 to 
150 000 residents received their regular meals from food aid over the period 1983/84 to 
1987/88, which accounted for some 25 percent of cereal imports. Extended over a ten year 
period to 1992/93 the aid share drops to about 21 percent. During 1992/93, food aid fed 
about 259400 Basotho or 13 percent of the population directly (Austin, 1993; Food 
Management Unit, 1994a; 1994c). 
These figures mask food access issues but do indicate that food aid, though feeding less 
people, reaches over 10 percent of the population. Both nutrition and consumption levels in 
the absence of food aid are likely to drop significantly, thus increasing food insecurity. With 
food aid targeted at vulnerable groups and no evidence of increases in deaths due to 
malnutrition and starvation (Bureau of Statistics, 1994 - Ministry of Health Survey Statistics), 
it seems that 'minimum' consumption and nutrition levels are sustained through food aid. 
Lesotho's population is growing at 2,6 percent per annum, and with Basotho mine-workers 
(whose remittances account for over 20 percent of household incomes (Bureau of Statistics, 
1994; Central Bank, 1995)) being retrenched from South Africa, the need for food aid in the 
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short and long-term is likely to continue. 
4.5 Contributions of food aid to the Lesotho economy 
Lesotho has some intractable food security problems and food aid in the form of free gifts , 
grants or low credit sales is imperative to prevent mass hunger . Provision of food aid 
releases financial resources for development and away from balance of payments priorities, 
debt servicing , and government expenditures by freeing valuable foreign exchange. In terms 
of a growing economy and increased imports from South Africa there is little evidence of 
displacement of commercial trade either internally or externally . Quasi estimates for food 
aid donations are based purely on financial criteria such as savings which amounted to about 
R15,9 million in 1992/93 (based on import 'price ' of commercial maize imports). 
The developmental benefits and investment contributions are difficult to establish and would 
need more information than is currently available . Schuh (1979) contended that analysts of 
food aid had neglected to explain the use of food aid to develop human capital. The school 
feeding program and the food-for-work programmes are examples of food aid contributing 
to the development of human capital. The food-for-work programme utilizing the Labour 
Construction Unit which was formed as a direct result of the availability of food aid (Jones, 
1977), provides both employment and skills empowerment to beneficiaries. The feeding of 
pregnant women and lactating mothers by the Ministry of Health are other examples of the 
development of human capital as well as food aids contribution to consumption and nutrition. 
Table 4.2 shows yearly contributions to Food for Work Programmes and the School Feeding 
Programme and the beneficiaries reached between 1988 and 1993 . These are examples of 
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food aid being used to form and develop human capital. 
Table 4.2 Contributions of food aid to the School Feeding Programme and Food for 
Work Programme in Lesotho, 1988 to 1993. 
YEAR School Feeding Programme Food for Work Programme 
Tons Beneficiaries Tons Beneficiaries 
1988 9745 1 308 244 5971 300 875 
1989 6997 1 343 560 1 838 110440 
1990 13 424 783 961 5797 379 785 
1991 12023 837434 5694 378 390 
1992 10 481 696082 6416 350225 
1993 9743 892 145 2 459 267 695 
I Average 10 402 976904 4696 297 902 I 
Source: Food Management Unit (1994b) 
* Figures are in Maize Ton Equivalent 
During the period the Food for Work Programme provided a yearly average of 4 696 tons 
of food to 297 902 beneficiaries or some 15 percent of the total population (1993 estimate of 
1,98 million: Bureau of Statistics, 1994). The School Feeding Programme provided 10 402 
tons of food to an average of 976 904 beneficiaries per annum. The government has tried 
to reduce the number of beneficiaries from the School Feeding Programme which may explain 
the relative decline in overall numbers. The aim was to target only vulnerable groups (not 
all school children fit this classification) and encourage greater self reliance by schools 
through production of their own food (Molelle , 1994). 
Food aid also provides budgetary support in the form of income from the proceeds of food 
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sales . These proceeds are often used to set up counterpart funds to finance the local costs 
of transportation and distribution of the food (Molelle, 1994). The main commercial mills 
claim that food aid contributions help to hold down food price increases and fluctuations 
(Lesotho Flour Mills, 1994; Lesotho Milling Company, 1994) ; the extent of this contribution 
is however difficult to establish. The monetization of some food aid through commercial 
sales by Lesotho Flour Mills may also impact on the overall food price index by dampening 
food prices rises. 
The possibility that aid may stop or be reduced would sorely test Lesotho's ability to expand 
imports due to its limited foreign exchange reserves. Currently foreign aid contributes about 
90 percent of capital expenditures (Ministry of Agriculture, 1995), since domestic savings are 
I 
too low for investment and there are foreign exchange constraints. 
4.6 Conclusions 
Lesotho's physical production resource constraints, high poverty levels, and high effective 
cereal demand require that food aid be a necessary condition to assure adequate food security 
in the short to medium and even long term. Maize yields have remained at around 650 
kg/hectare in the past decade, compared to South African farmers' yields of around 2 000 
kg/hectare . Lesotho soils are of low fertility , low quality and degraded due to poor 
management practices coupled with the slow land reform process (Sechaba, 1995; Mhlanga, 
1994; Phororo, 1995). Investments in agriculture have given low returns in the last 15 years, 
and the political costs associated with land reforms and changes to policy initiatives are 
prohibitive (Ministry of Agriculture, 1995). Surveys have shown that Basotho households 
82 
list the lack of food as their principal problem (Gay et ai, 1991). Poverty alleviation through 
increased economic development, increased employment, improved incomes and less external 
dependence are long term goals that are not immediately compatible with short to medium-
term food security concerns in Lesotho. 
Short-term alternatives for national food security in Lesotho , such as the establishment of 
food reserves, have been rejected since they were likely be very expensive (Molelle, 1994; 
Ministry of Agriculture, 1994b). The long-term approach previously defined in terms of food 
self-sufficiency has been de-emphasized and replaced with a more rigid food security 
approach (Government of Lesotho, 1986; 1992). This would be based on increased trading 
through improved access and availability of commercial imports and more secure and 
sustained food aid contributions. These must meet present and future cereal requirements, 
whilst the productive sector looks towards comparative advantages that may improve 
opportunities and incomes in the rural sector. 
A key point to note is that food aid has associated transportation, administration and storage 
costs (Faminow, 1995) . The inherent contradiction is that in the face of increased 
dependence on food aid, the Lesotho government is committed to reduce imports of 
agricultural commodities (Phororo, 1995). Food aid effectively acts as a grain reserve . 
Alternatives sought within the framework of food aid need to examine more extensively how 
the in-kind benefits can better be transferred to households and consumers who need them. 
Lesotho , as a food insecure country needs some form of food aid insurance scheme which 
would cover staple cereal supply deficits estimated to be 28 percent per annum. The figure 
is based on a normal (average) shortfall calculated over the period 1983/84 to 1992/93, and 
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varies from 48,15 percent during severe drought in 1991/92 to 9,93 percent in 1989/90 
(successful production season). It does not assume productivity gains since these are likely 
to be offset by population increases, the declining land base, the inelastic supply response of 
Lesotho farmers to price and other production incentives (Mokitimi, 1994) , and constrained 
growth of the economy (lower real incomes and employment levels) . 
Food aid will always have an important role to play in famine relief (concern for basic 
welfare need) . Drought is a recurring phenomena in Lesotho , now believed to occur in 2-5 
year cycles (National Early Warning Unit , 1994b). Food aid must therefore be used to 
systematically stabilize food supplies and to provide food to the poor and vulnerable. The 
crucial point is that Lesotho's food aid programme must be aimed primarily at the way aid 
is both given and used (Food and Agriculture Organization, 1985) to promote sustainable 
economic growth and development. Losses due to inefficiencies in the distribution and 
allocation of food aid must be minimised. 
Food aid continues to assure access of food to vulnerable groups and does not appear to 
negatively impact on local cereal production. It probably substitutes commercial imports of 
food that would have to be supplied by the state to feed vulnerable groups thereby freeing up 
foreign exchange for other uses . Consumer and producer prices of maize , the staple cereal , 
do not seem to be affected by food aid contributions to Lesotho . The nutritional status and 
quantity of cereals consumed by vulnerable persons would be negatively affected if supplies 
of food aid were reduced (as would the development of human capital) . Without structural 
changes that would markedly reduce poverty and increase household incomes over the long 
term, food aid will continue to serve a vital role in enhancing Lesotho 's food security. 
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POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Agricultural policies, provision of agricultural services , availability and use of land and 
natural resources, and the state of the economy all contribute towards assuring national food 
security . Domestic agricultural production is particularly important for attainment of food 
security by households and at a national level , since it provides a source of food , income and 
employment. Furthermore, it is important that agricultural growth be considered in terms of 
equity as well as efficiency if the question of food security is to be addressed, particularly in 
Lesotho where inequities and imbalances with regard to income and distribution of resources 
exist. 
Poverty alleviation through increased economIC development, increased employment, 
improved incomes and less external dependence are long term goals that are not immediately 
compatible with short to medium-term food security concerns in Lesotho . Surveys have 
shown that Basotho households list the lack of food as their principal problem (Gay et ai , 
1991). The policy objective of food self-sufficiency has clearly not worked (Sechaba, 1995; 
Ministry of Agriculture, 1995), and alternative food security objectives are suggested. 
Advocates who use pure economic criteria to increase food security would assert that a 
country should look at its comparative advantages , and if these do not lie with food 
production shift their resources to more competitive or comparatively advantageous export 
activities . The rationale is that the resultant gains in foreign exchange earnings would 
compensate and likely exceed the foreign exchange savings of the displaced food crops . 
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The issue is whether it is in fact a prudent policy instrument to judge self-sufficiency on the 
basis of ex ante competitiveness of food production relative to exports , without looking at 
the prospects of a balanced export-oriented measure along with the allocation of foreign 
reserves for food imports . Market liberalization through the reduction of state controls of 
markets , distributors , prices and of trade opportunities are important. The posit is that 
market distortions exist as a result of interventions that impact on food security. Crop 
production policies in Lesotho have tried to encourage aggregate self-sufficiency irrespective 
of the composition and local capacity to expand production, thereby ignoring potential 
benefits from trade. 
The food self sufficiency programme implemented by the Lesotho government encouraged 
mono-cropping and highly capitalized maize production at the expense of food security 
objectives (Swallow and Boris , 1988; Government of Lesotho, 1992; Bayley, 1992a; 1993b) . 
The government should phase out the Food Self-Sufficiency Programme and redirect 
agricultural transformation into the production of cash crops and other suitable agricultural 
products as envisaged in the more recent policy strategies for agriculture (Ministry of 
Agriculture, 1995; Food Studies Group, 1995). 
The supply and availability of maize in Lesotho over the study period has fluctuated , whilst 
there has been a slight drop in the per capita demand for maize. Price setting in Lesotho 
does not appear to influence productivity . Government is slow to respond to market signals 
that are more responsive to deregulated trade , and does not have the research and data 
collection and analysis capacity to monitor and legislate appropriate prices . Most farmers are 
net deficit producers , and do not benefit from a set formal producer price . Surplus producers 
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sell small quantities of maize grain to the local informal market. There seems little benefit 
for setting producer prices since the local producer price is used as a reservation price by 
producers . Wholesale and consumer prices have fallen in real terms in recent years even in 
the absence of competitive markets. Consumer interests have been enhanced through lower 
and more affordable maize meal prices , reducing food insecurity for most of Lesotho 's 
population (urban poor, rural landless , deficit producers) who are net purchasers of maize. 
Existing consumer subsidies of maize meal may be encouraging greater consumption while 
also negatively influencing consumption of other staple foods . However, per capita 
consumption levels have not risen to indicate this trend. 
The Lesotho government's main policy goal in the maize industry - from its policy 
interventions with respect to maize price controls - could be interpreted as an attempt to 
ensure price stability . The government sets high and consistent prices for producers, and 
tries to maintain low and stable consumer prices for maize meal. Government interventions 
to control maize prices, whilst regulating maize marketing by limiting the number of sellers 
and buyers through subsidies are easy to administer and the subsidies can be paid directly 
from the treasury as a reflection of the governments social and political priorities 
(Timmer, 1986: 138) . 
Government interventions tend to disproportionately favour minority surplus producers , who 
get subsidised credit, farm machinery services, and prices at the expense of majority deficit 
households . The maize marketing system is a virtual monopoly , especially in the processing 
of maize grain and marketing of maize meal. Current government legislation continues the 
proliferation of this status, and constrains a free competitive maize industry . Subsidies to 
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protect the monopolist commercial mills also hinder the growth of agro-industries in 
processing, distribution and merchandising. This allows the mills to achieve monopoly 
profits . 
The Lesotho government's goal to stabilize producer and consumer prices cannot be 
guaranteed or sustained. Experience shows that successful stabilization occurs when basic 
agricultural commodities are based on the border (world) price, and the market is flexible 
enough to operate without government intervention. Executing a stabilization policy, even 
within a specific price band, involves analyzing market price trends, setting and controlling 
domestic prices, financial flexibility and the capability to subsidize imports that are necessary 
to enforce the domestic price guidelines; this is a difficult responsibility for governments to 
execute efficiently (Timmer, 1986). 
The difficulty for the Lesotho government to maintain a price stabilization policy that keeps 
maize meal prices low, is that world and South African real prices have in the long run 
tended to decline, and Lesotho's small economy cannot influence this trend. It means that 
to have an impact, the price subsidy would have to grow in real terms, which may not be 
financially feasible or practical. The on-going macro-economic reforms suggested by the 
International Monetary Fund for Lesotho's Structural Adjustment Programme and the 
Enhanced Structural Adjustment Programme (Petersson, 1991 ; Government of Lesotho, 1994; 
Ministry of Agriculture, 1995), along with multi-lateral donor agencies (Food Studies Group , 
1995; World Food Programme, 1994a; 1994b), are that implied subsidies through price 
fixing, controls, and market distortions have negative budgetary consequences that the 
government of Lesotho cannot afford. 
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The most important aspect of any pricing policy in Lesotho is the border parity price. The 
South African producer price plays a crucial role in determining Lesotho's producer price. 
The South African Maize Board price affects Lesotho maize milling margins and acceptable 
mill-gate prices, therefore the consumer price for maize meal. The spread between the parity 
and domestic price is indicative of the potential for trade and involvement of the private 
sector in marketing maize grain at the producer level , and maize meal at the consumer level. 
If the parity price increases or fluctuates , the government tries to reduce its impact by 
adjusting maize milling margins and mill-gate prices . Parity pricing, however, hinders the 
functioning of an effective market process and fails to allow for differences in changes in 
productivity (agricultural and within the milling sector) over time (Pasour, 1990) . Border 
parity pricing would make the effective differences in productivity even more disparate. Gray 
(1992) points to numerous problems with border parity pricing, primarily those of high 
internal transfer costs in relation to the parity price, and that calculation of external parities 
is specific to a given time and location. This situation will remain as long as the Maize 
Board is the sole exporter of maize from South Africa (cheapest import source for Lesotho) . 
The Lesotho government should also consider current price setting mechanisms where 
reforms are suggested . The likely reason for cost of production pricing is the Lesotho 
government's desire to meet self-sufficiency targets in staples (Gray, 1992) , which may not 
be a sufficient or justifiable reason if relatively cheaper imports are available . Other changes 
considered include the removal of pan-territorial, and pan-seasonal producer and mill-gate 
prices . Use of pan-territorial pricing prevents both the private sector and parastatal bodies 
from engaging in profit-generating trade (Kingsbury , 1989; Muir and Takavarasha, 1989) . 
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Uniform prices also "infer an implicit transport subsidy which distorts resource allocation by 
encouraging the production of maize, which is a low value , high bulk commodity even in 
remote and unsuitable regions" (Muir and Takavarasha, 1989: 112). Price liberalization policy 
measures also need to be implemented, in conjunction with market / trade liberalization. This 
would mean that government would stop using both pan-territorial and pan-seasonal pricing 
tools . 
Takavarasha (1993) argues for closer alignment to world (border) prices for developing states . 
Lesotho maize grain prices should be allowed to reflect the South African Maize Board prices 
or South African producer prices. These prices represent world prices for the Lesotho maize 
industry . The cif South African producer price of maize grain would provide relief to food 
insecure households following full maize trade liberalization. The Lesotho government should 
argue that Basotho consumers and traders are part of the common market within the Southern 
African Customs Union and should be entitled to buy directly from South African producers , 
hence avoiding the South African Maize Board and its levies. This would be negotiated in 
conjunction with the South African Maize Board and relevant ministries such as Agriculture 
and Trade . This could reduce marketing costs , by cutting size and length of the marketing 
chain. All maize grain trade restrictions such as limits on purchases by traders and 
households should be reduced and eventually phased out. 
Both rural and urban consumers would then obtain their more preferred local coarser meal 
since more grain would enter the market and drive milling and transaction costs down. 
Unlike the trend in other Southern African states (eg . Zambia) where Grain Marketing Boards 
lost money in the 1980's due to trading deficits and other inefficiencies (Takavarasha, 1993) , 
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their absence in Lesotho has meant no such losses. Lesotho Flour Mills already produces a 
wide variety of goods and its profit record suggests that it could survive with less maize 
milling . Lesotho Milling Company would need to diversify and operate in other commodities 
given that its physical infrastructure, financial resources and human expertise are transferable . 
The existing major mills would benefit from buying less local maize grain if the condition 
that they purchase all locally produced maize that is delivered were dropped. 
Subsidies to the mills and consumers that primarily benefit urban consumers should be 
removed . These could be phased out over a short time to medium term period (eg . two 
years) for the impact not to cause major shocks in terms of consumer welfare losses (possibly 
with political and social consequences). In the short term the cost of food to the poor 
particularly maize meal could rise substantially. These negative impacts (higher maize meal 
prices) should be offset by the positive impacts (eg. lower maize grain prices, wider choices 
of maize meal to choose from) of the reforms suggested. 
The removal of protective measures will also affect the commercial mills (which are highly 
capitalized) by causing their value of fixed investments to fall (Mellor, 1988) . The impact 
of reforms on the mills may be negated if the mills spread their risk and portfolios by trading 
in other commodities . Market liberalization is meant to achieve principles of individual 
freedom of choice , efficiency, equity , sustainability and food security by allowing the market 
the full flexibility to make adjustments and regulate towards comparative advantages . 
Deregulation of the agricultural sector should be part and parcel of a holistic integrated 
approach to liberalization of the total economy. 
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No direct policy reforms are possible with respect to food aid dependence, though continued 
assurance of adequate supplies must be ensured . The government could redirect accrued 
savings from the removal of producer and consumer subsidies to increase direct assistance 
and interventions to ensure that food insecure households get food . The shift would signal 
to donors of the commitment government towards alleviating food insecurity. Food aid would 
continue to be very useful as a means of protecting the poor and food insecure from policy 
reforms and balancing the trade-off inherent in the adjustment policies (Mellor, 1988). Food 
aid use in development initiatives could be expanded to promote agricultural growth by 
supporting the switch from maize mono-cropping to cash crops and crops with higher returns 
/ potential than maize . Mellor (1988: 16) makes the point that food aid used in Food for 
Work Programmes to build rural infrastructure can decrease the cost of food production more 
than the potential depressing effect of food aid on producer prices. Furthermore, improved 
infrastructure has multiplier effects on agricultural growth, leading to expanded income and 
employment in other sectors of the economy (Mellor, 1988). 
Food-for-work programmes that encourage and promote development initiatives may, for 
example, lead to economically self-sufficient households . Food aid used in promoting 
development objectives should further shift emphasis towards investments in human capital 
(improved nutrition of the young and of pregnant mothers) thereby increasing their 
contribution to economic growth as productivity increases with good health (Schuh, 1979) . 
Considering the role women play in Lesotho, where a large proportion the male labour force 
are migrant workers in South Africa, human capital investment in women would be a long-
term investment. If such programmes then are targeted at the poor, they will improve the 
distribution of income and provide the basis for increased growth. 
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Households already derive benefit from reduced reliance on direct food supplements, since 
these cause little disruption to normal production incentives. In-kind direct food transfers, 
monetized food aid and granting direct cash grants are all possibilities for more efficient use 
of food aid . Direct cash grants are hardly utilized in Lesotho , but deserve attention, as 
alternative uses of cash are limited for food-deficit households . Cash transfers could help 
alleviate the poverty crisis if transaction costs were reduced and food availability were not 
a problem. Monetized aid is already used in the Production Through Conservation 
Programme to reduce natural resource degradation (Ministry of Agriculture, 1994b). 
Lesotho 's relationship with South Africa will be affected by any changes in the Southern 
African Customs Union agreement which is currently being re-negotiated. Recent changes 
in South African Maize Board export policy mean that Lesotho is now classified as an export 
market, unlike the past where it was regarded as part of the South African domestic market. 
The South African government would provide access to Lesotho of vital cereal grains during 
periods of crisis. The relevant issues are: 1) whether Lesotho would fall under the ambit of 
South Africa if vital food grain reserves have to be used in emergency situations; and 2) 
would the South African government offer concessions (price and preferential status) to 
Lesotho, whilst facing its own economic problems? 
Molapo (1995 : 16) emphasizes that "instead of proposing measures that lessen dependence, 
we talk about measures to reduce economic uncertainties" . The way in forward in the longer 
term may lie in exploring opportunities that would lead towards a Common Market or 
Economic Union with South Africa that would allow for a free flow of capital and labour. 
Free mobility of labour would in the short to medium-term lead to a high labour shift towards 
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South Africa thereby reducing Lesotho's unemployment and poverty levels and a fall in food 
aid dependence, though it would have implications for unemployment in South Africa since 
Basotho would compete directly with South Africans for employment. 
Lesotho and members of the Southern African Customs Union should in the short term 
consider a common agricultural policy. Such a policy would recognize and strengthen 
linkages between their commercial sectors whilst simultaneously encouraging development 
in the communal, subsistence sector (Otto and Darroch, 1992). Otto and Darroch (1992) and 
Molapo (1995) see possibilities for closer integration of economies in the region. The 
Lesotho and South African economies offer the closest linkages, and common agricultural 
development and the promotion of food security could be enhanced through a common 
agricultural policy, in light of the political and economic transformations that have occurred 
(Otto and Darroch, 1992; Molapo, 1995; Makoa, 1995). 
In the immediate short term, the possibility of establishing long term supply contracts with 
maize producers in South Africa could be considered. This would have to be negotiated with 
the South African Maize Board which is currently the sole exporter of maize and the South 
African government. Food trade involves market and price liberalization of all food 
commodities and includes reforms to their related industries and institutional arrangements. 
Current government proposals, largely arising from external pressure (Ministry of 
Agriculture, 1995), include a comprehensive programme to review and reformulate 
agribusiness policy and development, with the primary aim to enable greater private sector 
participation and free market mechanisms. 
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The required trade-offs between consumption requirements (food security needs) and 
investments , between support to producers and consumers, must be explicitly made and 
clearly explained to policy makers and to the people that the decisions affect. Policy reforms 
with respect to maize marketing and pricing , and food aid considerations should be consistent 
with macro-economic reforms currently underway. These include full market liberalization 
and deregulation, privatization / commercialization of parastatals , civil service reforms , and 
moves towards regional economic integration. Consistency and harmonization must be 
achieved between policy-making and analysis of economic factors and conditions for there to 
be economic benefits and improvements to food security in Lesotho. 
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SUMMARY 
Food security is a necessary condition for every nation, household and individual to survive . 
Food security is now generally defined to include both demand and supply factors. Poverty 
and low incomes appear to be the root causes of food insecurity . National food surpluses or 
national food self-sufficiency are not a sufficient condition for ensuring food security at the 
household level or for individuals. The failure of the food self-sufficiency policy objective 
makes it imperative for Lesotho to pursue alternative food security objectives. Households 
and individuals must have adequate and timely food available and accessible to them at all 
times. A holistic and balanced food security view is necessary. Appropriate policy 
mechanisms that can reduce food insecurity are a major concern of the Government of 
Lesotho . 
This study has investigated impacts of maize marketing and pricing policies as well as food 
aid on food security in Lesotho . There are inherent policy implications resulting from 
suggested changes to government legislation and food aid policies aimed at improving food 
security . In essence, the study aims to provide a basis upon which modifications and 
restructuring of maize pricing and market policy reforms are enhanced. These would provide 
for new and more flexible trade arrangements so that progress can be made to ensure better 
food security at national and household levels . 
The study concludes that set maize prices distort price signals which influence decisions to 
allocate, utilize and distribute resources for the growing and marketing of maize grain in 
Lesotho. Lesotho is a net importer of maize grain, implying that maize price fixing and 
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marketing policy affect food security. The study shows declining real producer, mill-gate and 
consumer prices , which can be explained by declining real maize prices in South Africa. 
This study supports the contention that subsidies do exist as a result of maize price fixing and 
controls , and confirms the existence of a highly regulated maize marketing system in Lesotho. 
It suggests that the maize marketing system should be liberalized, and that government phase 
out price fixing and price controls of maize grain and maize products to take full advantage 
of lower real maize prices in South Africa, Lesotho ' s principal trading partner. This may in 
the longer term increase both household and national food security by increasing affordability 
of maize grain and maize meal through lower market prices ; improve access to maize grain 
and maize meal via open trade and market arrangements, with producers in South Africa, 
reduce budgetary expenditures of the government, and in the long term be more sustainable . 
The micro policy reforms at a sectoral level (agriculture) would also support macro-economic 
reforms (national goals) . 
Trade plays an important role in food security , but at present both the impact and the precise 
role of trade in food security in Lesotho are not well understood . Import prices under 
deregulated markets may fall, increasing competition with local supplies and benefitting 
consumers . A likely worsening of balance of payments (due to greater imports) and export 
losses would necessitate a critical assessment of the comparative advantages and disadvantages 
of agricultural production in Lesotho. 
The role food aid plays in enhancing and maintaining food security in Lesotho is also very 
important. Food aid continues to assure access of food to vulnerable groups, without 
negatively impacting on local production an.d commercial cereal imports . Rather, food aid 
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to Lesotho supplements commercial imports to meet the shortfall in local production. If 
poverty cannot be reduced and household incomes remain low, food aid will continue to play 
a vital role in enhancing Lesotho's food security . Poverty alleviation measures and income 
generating activities should be the primary focus if food aid dependency is to be reduced. 
Food aid should be used to develop human capital , build infrastructure and support the 
transition from production of staple cereals to producing cash generating crops. These 
investments can provide the impetus for growth in the long term. 
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